


A Portrait of Israeli Jews

Beliefs, Observance, and Values of Israeli Jews, 2009



Research Team Leader: Asher Arian (z"l)

Data Analysis and Report: Ayala Keissar-Sugarmen

Survey conducted by the Guttman Center for Surveys
of the Israel Democracy Institute
for The AVI CHAI–Israel Foundation

A Portrait of Israeli Jews

Beliefs, Observance, and Values of Israeli Jews, 2009

Research Team Leader: Asher Arian (z"l)

Data Analysis and Report: Ayala Keissar-Sugarmen

**Data collection and statistical analysis: Dror Walter,
Dahlia Scheindlin, Shaul Slepak**

Academic Coordinators: Tamar Hermann, Raphael Ventura

Survey conducted by the Guttman Center for Surveys
of the Israel Democracy Institute
for The AVI CHAI–Israel Foundation

Hebrew editor: Noam Lester
English: Lenn Schramm, IBRT Jerusalem
English editor: Sharon Assaf
Field Work: Yitzhak Dayan Institute
Graphic Design and Typesetting: Stephanie and Ruti Design

No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, photographed, recorded, translated, stored in a database, broadcast, or distributed by any electronic, optical, mechanical, or other means. Commercial use of any sort whatsoever of this publication or any part thereof is forbidden without the express written consent of the publisher.

All rights reserved. Copyright © by the Israel Democracy Institute (R.A.) and AVI CHAI–Israel (R.A.), 2012

Israel Democracy Institute Publications
Tel: (02) 530-0888; 1-800-20-2222
Fax: (02) 530-08967
Email: orders@idi.org.il
Internet: www.idi.org.il
Address: Israel Democracy Institute, POB 4482, 91044 Jerusalem, Israel

AVI CHAI–Israel
Tel: (02) 621-5330
Fax: (02) 621-5331
Email: office@avichai.org.il
Internet: avichai.org/iw
44 King George St., 94262 Jerusalem, Israel
Address: POB 7617, 90176 Jerusalem, Israel

The Israel Democracy Institute is an independent, non-partisan body on the seam of academia and politics. The Institute plans policy and devises reforms for government and public administration agencies, and for the institutions of democracy.

In its plans and endeavors, the Institute strives to support the institutions of Israel's developing democracy and consolidate its values. The Institute's serious research work is followed up by practical recommendations, seeking to improve governance in Israel and foster a long-term vision for a stable democratic regime adapted to the structure, values, and norms of Israeli society. The Institute aspires to further public discourse in Israel on the issues placed on the national agenda, to promote structural, political, and economic reforms, to serve as a consulting body to decision makers and the broad public, to provide information and present comparative research.

Researchers at the Israel Democracy Institute are leading academics directing projects in various areas of society and governance in Israel. The Institute's publications department produces, markets, and distributes the results of their work in several series: Books, policy papers, The Israeli Democracy Index, the Caesarea Forum, periodicals, and conference proceedings.

The Israel Democracy Institute is the recipient of the 2009 Israel Prize for Lifetime Achievement – Special Contribution to Society and State.


The Guttman Center for Surveys was established in its present form in 1998, when the Guttman Institute for Applied Social Research became part of the Israel Democracy Institute. Professor Louis Guttman founded the original Institute in 1949 as a pioneering center for the study of public opinion and the advancement of social science methodology. The goal of the Guttman Center is to enrich public discourse on issues of public policy through the information retrieved from the Center's databases and through public opinion surveys conducted by the Center.

The AVI CHAI – Israel Foundation, a private foundation established in 1984, operates in Israel, North America, and the former Soviet Union. In pursuit of its commitment to the perpetuation of the Jewish people, Judaism, and the centrality of the State of Israel to the Jewish people, AVI CHAI has two main objectives:

- Encouraging mutual understanding and sensitivity among Jews of different religious backgrounds and with differing commitments to observance.
- Encouraging all Jews to have a stronger commitment to Jewish tradition and increasing their understanding and appreciation of the Jewish heritage, its precepts, customs, and values.

In cooperation with various outside parties, AVI CHAI initiates and funds diverse projects aimed at realizing these objectives.

Professor Asher Arian ז"ל (1938–2010)



Professor Asher Arian was among the foremost political scientists in Israel and a world-renowned expert on election studies and public opinion polls. Born in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1938, he immigrated to Israel in 1966.

Prof. Arian held a doctorate in political science from Michigan State University. In Israel, he founded the Political Science Department at Tel Aviv University and served as its first head. In 1977, he was appointed dean of Tel Aviv University's Faculty of Social Sciences; later he held the university's Romulo Betancourt Chair in Political Science. In 1979, Arian was a founding member of the Israel Political Science Association, which he also chaired. In 1986, he was appointed Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the Graduate Center of the City

University of New York. In the early 1990s he joined the Political Science Department at the University of Haifa, where he served as full professor until his retirement.

During Prof. Arian's years of extensive research activity, he published dozens of books and articles in the fields of governance, elections, public opinion, and political behavior in Israel. Two of the major projects under his leadership were a series of surveys and books on elections in Israel (the most enduring research project in political science in Israel, which he initiated in 1969) and the National Security and Public Opinion Project of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University.

Prof. Arian was one of the first senior fellows of the Israel Democracy Institute. In this capacity, he spearheaded the incorporation of the Guttman Institute for Applied Social Research into the IDI. In addition, he initiated and led the Democracy Index project, which offers a yearly assessment of the state of democracy in Israel from a comparative, historical, and international perspective.

Prof. Asher Arian passed away in the midst of his work on the 2010 Democracy Index. He will be greatly missed by all of us.

May his memory be a blessing.

Contents

Preface	11
Executive Summary	12
Summary of the Findings	13
Introduction and the Goals of the Survey	19
Method	26
Results	30
Chapter 1: Religiosity and the Observance of Tradition in Israel	30
Chapter 2: Jewish Lifestyle and Practices	35
Chapter 3: Religious Beliefs and Social Values	49
Chapter 4: Religion and Tradition in the Public Sphere and Israeli Democracy	58
Chapter 5: Jewish and Israeli Identity	68
Appendices	
Appendix A: The Survey Questionnaire	79
Appendix B: Comparison of the 2009 Sample with Central Bureau of Statistics Surveys	93
Appendix C: Extraction of Factors for the Various Chapters	95
Appendix D: Comparison of the Attitudes of the Background Groups for the various Chapters	99
Research Team	121

Preface

In the first half of 2009, the Guttman Center for Surveys of the Israel Democracy Institute, at the behest of The AVI CHAI - Israel, conducted a survey to examine the Jewish profile of Israeli society, with regard to religiosity, belief, values, and religious customs and tradition. The survey also related to Jewish Israelis' attitudes toward religion, the state, and public life, relations between different sectors of Israeli Jewish society, and relations between Israeli Jews and Diaspora Jewry.

This survey is a sequel to two earlier studies carried out by the Guttman Center in 1991 and 1999. Taken together, the three surveys present a unique continuum of Jewish religiosity in Israel. The return to the "field," using similar questionnaires, permits a comparison of the different periods and a diagnosis of the trends in religious observance over the past two decades.

A representative sample of the adult Israeli Jewish population (age 20 and over) was assembled for each of the three periods. The 2009 sample consisted of 2,803 Israeli Jews. The data were collected by frontal interviews conducted in two languages, Hebrew and Russian, depending on the subject's mother tongue.

The present report offers findings of the 2009 study, which relate to the entire adult Israeli Jewish population and the intermediate hues that mark its various sectors. The report also refers to the most prominent trends of the past two decades.

Executive Summary

The three surveys, conducted in 1991, 1999, and 2009, show that Judaism is present in the lives of Israeli Jews, although in different modes and doses and with internal contradictions between overt intentions and behavior.

Israeli Jews define their religiosity in a way that is essential and fundamental; whether an individual is secular or religious is often a package deal that combines distinct and distinguishing characteristics and attitudes. An analysis of the data collected in 2009 reveals that the level of Jewish religiosity is consistently linked to the distinctions between different sectors of the Israeli population—ethnic groups, classes separated by education and income—as well as to positions on issues such as democracy, the Law of Return, “Who is a Jew,” and the status of women.

From 1991 to 1999 there was a certain decline in attachment to Jewish tradition and religion, apparently under the impact of the mass immigration from the former Soviet Union. From 1999 to 2009 there was an increase in this attachment, which returned to and in some aspects even surpassed the level measured in 1991. This reversal of the trend (between 1999 and 2009) may be evidence that the immigrants from the former Soviet Union have been assimilated into Israeli society and adopted Jewish customs and traditions; it may also reflect an increase in the demographic numbers of the Orthodox and Haredim (ultra-Orthodox). It is plausible that were it not for the mass immigration from the former Soviet Union beginning in the early 1990s, the increase in religious observance from 1991 to 2009 would have been linear and steeper.

In 2009, one can say that many Israeli Jews have an interest in the place that religion occupies in the State of Israel and in the meaning of a “Jewish state”; they are sympathetic toward manifestations of religion and tradition in the public sphere. Nevertheless, they want to preserve freedom of individual choice, chiefly with regard to Sabbath observance in the public sphere.

Many Israeli Jews are also interested in the issue of “who is a Jew” and accept the official stance of the state, which supports Orthodox conversion only. Nevertheless, roughly half of the respondents favor recognition of non-Orthodox conversion. Support for allowing Jews to make *aliya* and immediately acquire Israeli citizenship is overwhelming, but qualified for those who are not Jewish according to *halakhah* (Jewish religious law).

The findings of the survey indicate that most Israelis believe that Israel can be both a Jewish state that observes religious law as well as a democratic country. They disagree, however, about how the two should be reconciled in the event of a conflict between them: almost half believe that democracy should always take precedence over *halakhah*. Some would follow *halakhah* in some cases and democracy in others. Only a few believe that *halakhah* should always prevail. The preference for *halakhah* over democracy is stronger, quite naturally, among the Haredi, Orthodox, and Traditional sectors than among secular Jews.

Finally, the survey findings indicate that most Israeli Jews feel a strong sense of belonging and affinity for the State of Israel and Judaism: for the vast majority it is important to live in Israel and to feel they are part of Israeli society and the Jewish people. What is more, the findings with regard to intergroup relations in Israel suggest that the friction between the secular and the religious was lower in 2009 than in 1999 (although this conclusion is not unambiguous, because it is based on only one question in the survey).

A similar trend was found in Israeli Jews’ sense of solidarity with world Jewry. The weakening observed in 1999 (as compared to 1991) has been checked; in 2009 (as compared to 1999) more Israeli Jews feel that Jews in Israel and Jews in the Diaspora share a common destiny and feel themselves part of the Jewish people worldwide.

The present report, based on a survey conducted in 2009, examines the Jewish facet of Israeli Jewish society near the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century. It considers aspects of beliefs, values, and religious customs and traditions, and looks at how these have changed or remained the same as compared to the earlier surveys, conducted in 1991 and 1999.

A representative sample of the adult Israeli Jewish population (age 20 and over) was assembled for each of the three periods. The 2009 sample consisted of 2,803 Israeli Jews. The data were collected by frontal interviews conducted in two languages, Hebrew and Russian, depending on the subject's mother tongue.

Even though there are differences of patterns and doses in them, all three surveys demonstrate that Judaism is present in the consciousness of many Israeli Jews, and is expressed chiefly in the observance of customs and rituals, but also in belief and values.

The findings reveal a strong correlation between how Israeli Jews define themselves with regard to religion (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, not religious, or anti-religious) and the extent to which they observe Jewish tradition. It was also found that Israeli Jews' definition of their religiosity and the extent to which they observe tradition is essential and fundamental and is consistently linked (as the analysis that follows shows) to sociodemographic variables such as ethnic origin and level of education and income. Some differences were found, though not consistently, between men and women and between respondents in different age cohorts. This essentiality is also manifested in differences in attitudes on other issues examined by the survey, such as democracy, the Law of Return, and the status of women (these were examined only in the 2009 survey). In other words, "secularism" or "religiosity" is often a package deal that combines diverse characteristics and attitudes.

The passage of the years has seen certain changes in how Israeli Jews define their religiosity and the extent to which they observe religious tradition: between 1991 to 1999 there was a decline in the percentage of Israeli Jews who defined themselves as observing religious tradition to a great extent (from 24% to 19%)—evidently under the impact of the large wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union. This trend has been reversed; between 1999 and 2009 there was an increase in the percentage of Israeli Jews who observe religious tradition to a great extent (from 19% to 26%). In addition, more Israeli Jews identified themselves as Orthodox or Haredi in 2009 than in 1999 (22% and 16%, respectively). Correspondingly, a smaller percentage of Jews defined themselves as secular but not anti-religious or as secular and anti-religious in 2009 than had done so in 1999 (46% and 52%, respectively). The declining trend in attachment to tradition and religion from 1991 to 1999, followed by its reversal from 1999 to 2009, restoring or even surpassing (for some indexes) the situation that existed in 1991, is found in most of the items presented in the present report.

This reversal of the trend between 1999 and 2009 may be evidence that the immigrants from the former Soviet Union have been assimilated into Israeli society and have adopted Jewish customs and traditions; it may also reflect an increase in the demographic numbers of the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox. It is plausible that were it not for the mass immigration from the former Soviet Union beginning in the early 1990s, the increase in religious observance from 1991 to 2009 would have been linear and steeper.

Jewish Lifestyle and Practices

An analysis of the importance of tradition in the lifestyles and practices of Israeli Jews reveals the complex and multifaceted nature of Israeli society, as attested by the main findings of the present report.

The Sabbath: Half of the respondents said that tradition is “very important” or “important” in influencing what they do on the Sabbath. About a third of the respondents said that they observe the Sabbath meticulously or to a great extent; more than 80% reported that they try to be with their families on the Sabbath “all the time” or “frequently”; and more than two-thirds said this with regard to a special meal on Friday night. Note that even though most Israeli Jews do not violate Sabbath prohibitions, most of them favor allowing individual freedom of choice and permitting weekday activities on the Sabbath in the public sphere (see below).

Holidays: A majority of Israeli Jews (85%) say that it is “important” or “very important” for them to celebrate Jewish holidays in the traditional manner; even more (90%) say this about the Passover *seder*. Many (82%) say that they light Hanukkah candles “always” or “frequently,” but a smaller percentage refrain from eating *hametz* (bread) on Passover (67%), fast on Yom Kippur (68%), listen to the public reading of the *Megillah* (Book of Esther) on Purim (36%), or take part in an all-night study session on Shavuot (20%).

Kashrut: Most Israeli Jews eat only kosher food at home (76%) and outside the home (70%) and report never eating pork (72%). Most say that they do so for religious motives.

Lifecycle ceremonies: An overwhelming majority (more than 90%) of Israeli Jews believe that it is “important” or “very important” to conduct the main Jewish lifecycle rituals—circumcision, sitting *shiva*, celebrating a bar mitzvah, and saying *kaddish* for one’s parents. Most of those who said that it was “important” or “very important” to circumcise their sons, and most of those who said that a bar mitzvah is “important” or “very important,” do so for religious reasons. But although a majority of Israeli Jews believe that it is “important” or “very important” to have a religious wedding (80%), their stand on this is not unequivocal. Only about half of Israeli Jews (54%) reject the possibility that they or a family member might opt for civil marriage, were this available in Israel.

Studying Judaism and Jewish rituals: More than two-thirds of Israeli Jews say that it is “very important” or “important” to study *Tanakh* (Bible), Talmud, and other Jewish classical texts. But only a minority of respondents reported that they themselves have a “great” or “fairly great” interest in topics related to the Jewish religion, in studying classical Jewish texts from books or on the Internet, in manifestations of Judaism in music, or in New Age, spiritualism, or mysticism. A minority of respondents “always” or “frequently” consult with a rabbi about personal problems or “frequently” or “sometimes” make pilgrimages to the tombs of righteous men.

Summary: A statistical analysis of the survey findings reveals the following pattern: An especially high average score was received by the observance of Jewish precepts and customs such as circumcision, bar or bat mitzvah, and a traditional Jewish burial (4.3 out of 5). A fairly high score was received by observance of Jewish precepts and customs such as observing *kashrut*, fasting on Yom Kippur, reciting *kiddush* on Friday night, and lighting Sabbath candles (3.6 out of 5), as well as observing the Sabbath prohibitions (3.4 out of 5). A midrange average score was received

by practices showing awareness of routine-practical aspects of tradition in daily life, such as determining the number of children in the family, selecting a career or spouse, and how one dresses (2.4 out of 5); a low to midrange score was received by observance of Jewish practices which we categorized as “religious,” such as going to synagogue, hearing the public reading of the *Megillah* on Purim (1.6 out of 5); and a very low score was received by “contemporary” interest in Judaism such as surfing the Internet for Jewish topics or an interest in New Age, spiritualism, or mysticism (1.0 out of 5).

Religious Belief

A vast majority of the respondents to the survey said that they believe in God and will be rewarded for good deeds and punished for misdeeds, as well as in the power of prayer. Most (about two-thirds) also reported a strong belief in the uniqueness of the Jewish people and the Torah. Smaller percentages (about half) indicated a belief in the World to Come and the Messiah; about a third reported a strong belief that a Jew who does not observe the precepts endangers the entire Jewish people.

The average score for the items related to belief in a higher power was 2 (on a scale where 0 indicates no belief and 3 indicates full belief). In other words, we could say that Israeli Jews are religious believers, but “sometimes aren’t sure.” Two main trends can be noted here: with regard to belief in general (such as the existence of a higher power that governs the world) there has been a slight but statistically significant increase in the percentage of believers in 2009 as compared to 1999 and 1991. On the other hand, with regard to specifically Jewish items (such as the coming of the Messiah), belief was lower in 1999 than in 1991, but had returned to the 1991 level in 2009.

Religion and Tradition in the Public Sphere

Most Israeli Jews (61%) believe that public life in the State of Israel should be conducted according to the Jewish religious tradition; a majority are “interested” or “very interested” in the place of religion in the State of Israel (65%) and in the meaning of a “Jewish state” (70%). About half of Israeli Jews believe that public life in the country should continue to be conducted as it is today; about a quarter believe that Israel should be more religious than it is today, and about a quarter believe that it should be less religious.

Nearly 60% support permitting weekday activities on the Sabbath. Roughly two-thirds of the respondents are in favor of allowing movie theaters, cafes, and restaurants to be open and of holding sporting events. More than half support public transportation on the Sabbath and permitting shopping centers to do business as usual. On the other hand, an overwhelming majority (87%) believe that food served in public institutions must be kosher. With regard to civil marriage, roughly half believe that civil marriage outside the rabbinate should be instituted in Israel (51% answered “absolutely,” “yes” or “perhaps yes”); while one-fifth of the respondents (19%) replied that the rabbinic courts demonstrate a pertinent and neutral stance in matters of marriage and divorce.

Certain differences were found in items in this category that were included in all three surveys. In response to the general question of the extent to which respondents agree that public life in Israel should be conducted according to Jewish religious tradition, there was significant and steady increase from 1991 to 2009 (44% in 1991, 61% in 2009). For all other questions, there was a downward trend of support for traditional and religious positions from 1991 to 1999, followed by a rise from 1999 to 2009 (this is consistent with the other findings).

Attitudes about Relations between the Religious and the Secular

More than half of the respondents (55%) believe that relations between the religious and nonreligious in Israel are “not so good” or “not at all good.” Most of them (59%) have few or no close friends who differ from them with regard to observing the religious precepts (“more observant or less observant than you are”). Nevertheless, three-quarters would agree (“to some extent” or “strongly”) for their children to attend a school that enrolls both secular and religious children. With regard to the controversial issue of the conscription of *yeshiva* students into the Israel Defense Forces, there was a fairly sweeping consensus: 85% of the respondents “agree” or “totally agree” that *yeshiva* students should be subject to the military draft.

In this category it was possible to study long-term trends only with regard to the general question of relations between the religious and the secular. From 1991 to 1999 there was a decline in the percentage of those who believed that relations between the religious and the nonreligious are “fairly good” or “very good,” followed by a strong rebound in 2009 (29% in 1991, 17% 1999, 43% in 2009).

Attitudes about Democracy and the Bond to Tradition and Religion

The survey inquired about Israeli Jews’ attitudes toward the connection between halakhah and democratic principles. Most respondents (73%) believe that Israel can be both a Jewish state that adheres to halakhah as well as a democratic state. But fewer than half (44%) said that, in the event of a contradiction between halakhah and democratic principles, democracy should always take precedence; 20% believe that halakhah should always be preferred and 36% that each case must be judged on its own merits.

On the question of whether Israel can be a state that is both Jewish (observing halakhah) and democratic, most of those who defined themselves as Orthodox or as Traditional and observe Jewish tradition to a great extent answered in the affirmative, exceeding the percentage of secular respondents and Haredi respondents (those who are meticulous about every point of the tradition) who did so. Only one-third of the anti-religious respondents answered this question in the affirmative. Respondents who are more religious and those who observe Jewish tradition to a greater extent held that halakhah should always be preferred to democracy when there is a contradiction between the two, as opposed to less religious respondents and respondents who observe tradition to a lesser extent, who did not believe so.

Sense of Belonging and Individual Identity—Israeli and Jewish

The survey found that most Israeli Jews have a strong sense of membership in and attachment to the State of Israel and the Jewish people. The vast majority say it is important to live in Israel and to feel that one is part of the Jewish people and Israeli society. Correspondingly, almost all believe that it is “fairly important” or “very important” to remember the Holocaust. Furthermore, most respondents (88%) would like to live in Israel in the long term (answering “certainly yes” or “yes but not certain”); a similar percentage (84%) consider themselves to be Zionists (“absolutely yes” or “yes”).

Half of Israeli Jews define themselves primarily as Jews; 40%, as Israelis. As expected, secular Jews who are not anti-religious and secular Jews who are anti-religious define themselves chiefly as Israelis, whereas the Traditional, Orthodox, and Haredim define themselves mainly as Jews. However, approximately one-third of the secular who are not anti-religious define themselves as Jews, and one-third of the Traditional define themselves as Israelis.

The Law of Return and “Who is a Jew”

Many Israeli Jews are interested in the question of “who is a Jew” (62% of the respondents are “interested” or “very interested”). Orthodox respondents expressed the greatest interest, followed by Haredi respondents and Traditional respondents (86%, 79%, and 72%, respectively). Secular and anti-religious respondents were much less concerned by it (47% and 20%, respectively).

Analysis of the data shows that Israeli Jews’ support for the Law of Return in its present format is not uniform: a majority (87%) “support” or “absolutely support” allowing Jews to immigrate to Israel and receive citizenship immediately; but only half (53%) support this privilege for the non-Jewish spouses of Jews, and even fewer (43%) for the non-Jewish grandchildren of a Jewish grandfather. Note that support for allowing Jews to immigrate and receive citizenship immediately is almost wall to wall, with no differences among sectors.

The survey found broad agreement with the statement that a person can be a good Jew even if he or she does not observe the religious tradition (92% of respondents). Smaller percentages, but still a majority (61%), “agree” or “totally agree” that the Conservative and Reform movements should have equal status in Israel with the Orthodox. But most Israeli Jews (69%) have never attended a prayer service or religious ceremony in a Reform or Conservative synagogue.

In general, a majority of Israeli Jews (73%) accept the official position in Israel that Orthodox conversion is the path leading to recognition of a person’s Jewishness (even if he or she does not observe the precepts). Fewer (48%) accept non-Orthodox conversion. Correspondingly, most Israeli Jews do not recognize the Jewishness of a person who feels him/herself to be Jewish even though his or her parents are not Jews.

Israel and the Diaspora

The overwhelming majority of respondents feel that they are part of world Jewry (93% replied “yes” or “absolutely yes”). A majority (81%) also “agree” or “totally agree” that without the Jewish religion the Jewish people would no longer exist. Smaller percentages, although still a majority,

believe that the Israeli Jews and Diaspora Jews have a shared destiny (73% replied “yes” or “absolutely yes”). Nevertheless, more than half of the respondents “agree” or “totally agree” that the Jews in Israel are a different nation than the Jews abroad.

An examination of the three surveys indicates that from 1991 to 1999 there was a decline in the sense of solidarity felt by Israeli Jews with international Jewry, followed by an increase from 1999 to 2009. This trend is important, when taken in conjunction with the statement that the Jews in Israel are a different people than the Jews abroad (71% agreement in 1999; 57% in 2009), but also with the statement that the Jews in Israel and the Jews in the Diaspora have a common destiny (68% agreement in 1999; 73% in 2009).

The present survey, conducted in 2009, is a sequel to two earlier surveys carried out by the Guttman Center for Surveys (formerly the Louis Guttman Israel Institute of Applied Social Research), in cooperation with AVI CHAI–Israel, in 1991 and 1999, and published in 1993 and 2002, respectively. Taken together, the three reports present a unique continuum of Jewish religiosity in Israel. In addition to the detailed profile and description of public attitudes on issues associated with religiosity and observance at each of these three points in time, the return to the “field,” using similar questionnaires, permits a comparison of the different periods and a diagnosis of the trends that developed over the past two decades.

In the spirit of the “waves” of the previous surveys, the present study, too, seeks to investigate issues such as religious behavior, religious customs and traditions, Jewish values in Israeli society, and the relations between religion and state. Nevertheless, it also addressed questions not considered by its two predecessors.

1. Main Findings of the Previous Reports

As noted, surveys were conducted in 1991 and 1999, with the goal of tracing the patterns of religious behavior in Israeli Jewish society, drawing a profile of public ideas and attitudes related to Jewish tradition, and following their trends over time. The lead researchers were Prof. Elihu Katz, Dr. Shlomit Levy, and Dr. Hanna Levinsohn. The first report (1993)¹ laid the empirical foundations for a discussion of various questions, including the religious self-definition of the Jewish citizens of Israel, the extent to which they observe the religious precepts, traditional values and beliefs, attitudes about the relations between religion and state, a mapping of social fissures, the link between religiosity and ethnic background, the role of religion in the lives of secular Israelis, and attitudes toward Jewish tradition among 1990s immigrants from the former Soviet Union. The main findings of the first survey were as follows:

- The most common self-definitions reported by Jewish Israelis were “not Orthodox, observe tradition to some extent” and “Traditional.”
- Two-thirds of Jewish Israelis had a strong Jewish identity. But whereas most of those who defined themselves as Haredi or Orthodox identified themselves as Jews first, most of the secular identified themselves as Israelis first.
- Most Jewish Israelis felt that they were part of world Jewry but related to Jews in Israel as a group that is distinct from the communities in the Diaspora.
- A sweeping majority of Jewish Israelis felt that they were living in accordance with Jewish values.
- A sweeping majority of Israeli Jews reported that they observed tradition to some extent or other—participating in a Passover *seder*, lighting Hanukkah candles, fasting on Yom Kippur, and so on.
- Respondents of Mizrahi origin observed tradition more than those of Ashkenazi origin did.

1 S. Levy, H. Levinsohn, and E. Katz, *Beliefs, Observances and Social Interactions among Israeli Jews* (Jerusalem: The Louis Guttman Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, 1993).

- A majority believed that the state must have a Jewish character, though not necessarily a religious one. In other words, many Israelis endeavored to combine their bond with religious tradition with a maximum of free choice in daily life.

The second report (2002)² focused on a comparison of the data obtained in the first and second waves of research. The most prominent findings of this comparison included the following:

- Between 1991 and 1999, there was a slight increase in the number of nonreligious Israelis who do not observe any religious precepts and who ascribe no importance to Jewish lifecycle rituals.
- Compared to 1991, there was erosion in solidarity, on both the intra-Israeli and the worldwide Jewish fronts. Fewer Israeli Jews felt an intimate connection with Diaspora Jewry and fewer believed in social solidarity within Israel.
- Over the years, the Jewish Israelis had become slightly more liberal and expressed wider support for public transport on the Sabbath or nonkosher food in public institutions.
- The immigrants from the former Soviet Union were found to be mostly secular and to evince a suspicious attitude toward religion, religious customs, and the mixing of religion with public life. Nevertheless, a significant number of them reported that they fasted on Yom Kippur, attended a Passover *seder*, and lit Hanukkah candles; that is, like veteran secular Israelis, a significant proportion of the immigrants felt a certain closeness to Jewish tradition.
- Both reports concluded that there are tensions among the several groups that observe tradition to different extents. Nevertheless, Israeli society is not polarized on the basis of religious affiliation. Jewish identity and values have continued to characterize all sectors of society over the years.

The publication of the two reports generated a strong reaction and criticism and inspired protracted and serious discussions in the academic world as well as among the public at large. The criticism focused mainly on the interpretation of the findings and the overall picture painted by the two reports. For example, some critics did not agree with what they saw as the reports' excessive optimism, which, in their view, failed to adequately reflect the true severity of the religious-secular divide in Israel.

2. Reactions to the Previous Reports

The results of the first survey were discussed in a conference held at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute in December 1992. Israel Bartal maintained that the findings described a society whose link to religious tradition is very weak, rather than "transcending sectors," as the report contended. According to him, the public's preference for selective observance of religious precepts is the manifestation of anti-religious behavior that is incompatible with the essence of the Jewish

2 S. Levy, H. Levinsohn, and E. Katz, *A Portrait of Israeli Jewry: Beliefs, Observances, and Values among Israeli Jews 2000* (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute and the AVI CHAI Foundation, 2002).

religion and provokes tension between the various sectors. For Bartal, the Haredim would rather that the secular public totally reject tradition rather than observe it in part. Another argument heard at the conference was that the survey had not in fact measured religious behavior, as its originators had intended, but rather the norms of Israeli Jewish society. According to Charles Liebman, Israeli society is a family-oriented society, grounded on norms of family and home life; and this makes it extremely difficult to distinguish religious behavior in the sense used in the literature from behavior that is based on family values. Holding a Passover *seder* and lighting the Sabbath candles express the family value of being together but have no religious significance; these practices express family traditionalism, not religious traditionalism.³ Other scholars, including Moshe Lissak, asserted that the report did not reflect the secular public's true feelings about religious coercion and the Orthodox control of public life in Israel. Lissak expressed his fear that this issue could become much worse in the future. Eliezer Schweid, too, thought that the report was overly optimistic. For him, the almost wall-to-wall observance of tradition in the Jewish sector, to some extent or another, does not constitute a bridge between the extremes of society, because the gulf between the secular and religious has not diminished over the years.⁴ Joining the chorus of criticism, Menachem Friedman asserted that one had to be much more cautious about interpreting the findings and devising conceptions that sometimes confound the ideal with the actual. For example, the data indeed showed that two-thirds of Israeli Jews "keep kosher"; in fact, only about half of the respondents reported that they use separate dishes for milk and meat in their homes. In Friedman's evaluation, one consequently cannot reach the conclusion (as the authors of the report did) that most Israeli Jews observe *kashrut*.⁵

Criticism of the 2002 report was less focused. Unlike the first report, there was no conference at which academics reviewed the research. Consequently, in preparation for the third Guttman–AVI CHAI survey it was decided to ask scholars to submit their critiques of the previous studies and propose new lines of thought.⁶ Asher Arian and Neri Horowitz proposed re-evaluating the meaning of various religious customs for different groups, in pursuit of an answer to the question of "whether and when it is a matter of religion, and when it is family tradition." Others argued that in order to improve the research, a new framework of conceptualization is needed, one that includes terms such as "the secularization of religion" and "civil religion." Marvin Schick (a consultant for AVI CHAI) suggested that, in order to understand the new trends in Israeli society, the research be expanded to include qualitative instruments, with the addition of new questions and modification of the old ones, even though this would detract from the ability to draw comparisons with the first two surveys. Shlomit Levi and Hanna Levinsohn (co-authors of the previous reports) believed, by contrast, that continuity was important; the same questions

- 3 C. S. Liebman, "Reconceptualizing the Culture Conflict among Israeli Jews," *Israel Studies* 2 (2) (1997), pp. 172–189.
- 4 C. S. Liebman, "Academics and Other Intellectuals," in C. S. Liebman and E. Katz, eds., *The Jewishness of Israelis: Responses to the Guttman Report* (Albany, SUNY Press, 1997).
- 5 M. Freedman, "The State Comments on the Guttman Report," *ibid.*
- 6 A collection of comments on the Guttman AVI CHAI reports collects the thoughts and insights of seven scholars: Asher Arian, Hanna Herzog, Neri Horowitz, Nissim Leon, Hanna Levinsohn, Shlomit Levi, and Marvin Schick. Although never published, it is available for study in the library of the Guttman Center for Surveys at the Israel Democracy Institute.

should be asked as before, and the same analytical methods employed, so that comparisons could be drawn with the past. They also proposed expanding the demographic section of the questionnaire, since additional information about the respondents could improve understanding of the findings and enhance their interpretation.

Neri Horowitz and Nissim Leon proposed that new issues, such as religious versus secular education and the public's attitude toward the several educational systems be investigated, as well as the link between religion and the ethnic divide and the element of ethnicity in the religious sector. Hanna Herzog and Nissim Leon thought that the study should consider the links between religion and gender. Neri Horowitz suggested looking at new social and cultural trends in Haredi society. Asher Arian wrote of the need to relate to the linkage between religion and politics: juxtaposing the Gaza disengagement (2005) with religious values, looking at religious and anti-religious political parties. He also deemed it advisable to highlight the complexity of the relations between Israel and the Diaspora, as reflected in Israeli public opinion. He proposed re-evaluating the attitude of the immigrants from the former Soviet Union to religion and tradition, twenty years after the start of that wave of immigration, and focusing more on the relations between religion and state through a closer look at issues that have been on the agenda in recent years: the status of the Sabbath, civil marriage, and conversion.

An intriguing idea about the religious identity of the immigrants from the former Soviet Union (one of the main topics of the 2002 report) was voiced at an academic conference held at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute. Chen Bram and Julia Lerner asserted that the common description of the immigrants as anti-religious and secular is incorrect. According to them, anyone who grew up in the former Soviet Union is oriented toward the search for absolute truth, a tendency that frequently brings the immigrants closer to Jewish tradition and religion. What is more, these immigrants' support for right-wing political views makes it difficult for them to reject religious ideas that provide unambiguous answers to the question of ownership of this country.⁷

3. The Study of Religiosity in Israel

Most of the research published since the release of the second report deals with the general and material question first raised by the 1993 and 2002 reports: identifying the trends among Jews in Israel and the manifestations of the interactions among modernity, secularism, and traditional inclinations. Charles Liebman had this to say about secularism in Israel: "Being a Jewish secularist does not mean being a Jew who is not influenced by Jewish values or who has no connection with spiritual or metaphysical matters or no interest in the Jewish heritage."⁸ In support of this idea, Asher Cohen and Baruch Zisser defined most secular persons in Israel as Jewish secularists, who are far from the universal model of secularism and feel a need to be participants in the

7 Ch. Bram and Y. Lerner, "The Ultra-Orthodox in Russian: On Processes of Becoming Ultra-Orthodox and Return to Religious Observance among Russian Speakers in Israel," presented at a conference. "The Ultra-Orthodox and Ultra-Orthodoxy in Israel at the Crossroads," Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2007.

8 Y. (Charles) Liebman, "The Culture Wars in Israel: A New Mapping," in Anita Shapira, ed., *State in the Making: Israeli Society in the First Decades* (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 2001), p. 256 (Hebrew).

traditional Jewish experience.⁹ Sami Smootha, who applied various metrics to examine Israel's affiliation with the western world, emphasized that, because wars of religions have not (yet) been waged in Israel, there is no separation between the religious establishment and the state. This is in contrast to most countries in the West, who passed through this phase in the nineteenth century. According to Smootha, the confrontation between the religious and the secular in Israel is on a "low flame": the religious establishment has a monopoly on marriage, divorce, and burial, as well as on the definition of who is a Jew, but the secular are not willing to acquiesce in this monopoly. Smootha noted that the Orthodox monopoly of Judaism in Israel is a special case in the Jewish world; elsewhere, religious institutions generally adapt themselves to modern realities, emphasize the universality of their values, and do not infringe the rights of women or of intermarried couples.

Smootha disagreed with the main conclusions of the Guttman–AVI CHAI reports. In his view, it is not religion that stands at the center of the Israeli mentality, but the intimate bond to Jewish culture and the Jewish heritage, including customs and language. He holds that Jews in Israel are able to develop a Jewish identity even if they are not religiously observant; their connection to religion is weaker than that of Jews in the United States. This is a source of the tension between the secular, who feel close to tradition and the Jewish heritage but not to religion, and the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox, who want the state to be run in accordance with Torah law.¹⁰ Some scholars propose relating to the Traditional sector in Israel as clear evidence that religious values can adapt to processes of modernization. Members of the Traditional sector resist the pressures exerted on them by both the secular and the religious and are able to develop a separate and essentially modern identity, based on free choice, selective observance of Torah precepts, and acceptance of other identities as legitimate.¹¹

Cohen and Zisser, too, put forth the idea that Israeli society is undergoing processes of modernization, and that it is precisely the growing power of the ultra-Orthodox (some of whom resist the process) that demonstrates this. This also explains the depth of the religious fissure and the directions in which it is evolving. They see the religious-secular rift as a deep gulf rather than a low-intensity conflict and emphasize its potential to erupt into a crisis. They maintain that even though the external threat (inescapable in the Israeli situation) is supposed to unite society and relegate the internal debates to the margins, the Israeli public views the chasm between the religious and the secular as deeper than that between the Jews and the Arabs. According to them, there is a gradual transition from acceptance and agreement to escalation and crisis, as extremists on both sides seize control of the situation. The fact that in Israel, the religious identity is part of the collective identity and is correlated with national and political identity further exacerbates the fissure between the religious and the secular.¹²

9 Asher Cohen and Baruch Zisser, *From Accommodation to Escalation* (Tel Aviv: Schocken, 2003) (Hebrew).

10 Sami Smootha, "Is Israel Western?" in U. Cohen, E. Ben-Rafael, A. Bareli, and E. Yaar, eds., *Israel and Modernity: In Honor of Moshe Lissak* (Jerusalem: Yad Itzhak Ben-Zvi, 2006) (Hebrew).

11 Y. Yadgar and Y. Liebman, "Beyond the Dichotomy of Religious and Secular: The Traditional Sector in Israel," *ibid.* (Hebrew)

12 Cohen and Zisser, *From Accommodation to Escalation* (above no. 9).

Other scholars, however, have fully endorsed the position presented in the first report. Shlomo Deshen argued that the survey offered empirical proof that Israeli society has experienced the same processes that American Jewry did previously: a blurring of the boundaries between religiosity and secularism, free choice of customs to be followed, and so on.¹³ Other researchers, drawing on the report, asserted that Israeli Jews' attitude toward Judaism should be analyzed as a continuum rather than as a dichotomy between religious and nonreligious.¹⁴

The Guttman–AVI CHAI surveys have stimulated not only critical discussion but also the creation of theoretical models that offer new cultural perspectives on Israeli Jewish society. Liebman's model divides Israeli society into three political cultures: The first, which he designated the "religio-political culture," comprises the ultra-Orthodox and National Religious, who, despite the differences between them, see halakhah as a binding norm that guides their lives and shapes their political, social, and cultural attitudes. The second, the "consumerist–post-modernist culture," consists of the minority that rejects Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state and demands that it become the state of all its citizens. He characterized the third, the "secular-Jewish culture," as a rising force in Israeli society, adhered to by Israeli Jews who, though they do not see themselves as religious, assign symbolic and cultural value to religion.¹⁵

Yair Sheleg also related to secular culture, which in recent years has begun incorporating Jewish tradition, with some secular persons enrolling in programs to study religious texts, similar in their framework to a religious *beit midrash* (study group/study house). He emphasized, however, that this attention to Jewish identity in the framework of a secular *beit midrash* is not typical of the public at large, but only of small elites.¹⁶

Another theoretical model based on the Guttman–AVI CHAI surveys was proposed by Ezra Kopelowitz and Lior Rosenberg, who argued that the variation in how Israeli Jews relate to Diaspora Jews can be viewed as a factor that divides Israeli Jewish society into two camps: Jewish Israelis and Israeli Jews. "Israeli Jews" are more religious and are unable to imagine themselves without strong bonds to Diaspora Jewry. They see the Jewish people in the Diaspora as a monolithic entity with Judaism as its center. By contrast, "Jewish Israelis," most of whom are secular, see their Israeli identity as something autonomous that is associated with Judaism but is nevertheless a solid and freestanding entity. Jewish Israelis do not feel any strong emotional bond to Diaspora Jewry and do not believe that Israelis and Jews who live abroad are really part of the same people.¹⁷

Asher Arian was deeply troubled by the trend revealed by the Guttman–AVI CHAI surveys, namely, that Jews in Israel are increasingly less likely to view themselves and Diaspora Jews as

13 Liebman, "Academics and Other Intellectuals" (above n. 4).

14 E. Ben-Rafael and Y. Peres, *Is Israel One? Religion, Nationalism, and Multiculturalism Confounded* (Leiden: Brill, 2005).

15 Liebman, "Reconceptualizing the Culture Conflict" (above n. 3).

16 Y. Sheleg, *From the Old Hebrew to the New: The Renaissance of Judaism in Israeli Society* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2010) (Hebrew).

17 E. Kopelowitz and L. Rosenberg, "Israeli-Jews' vs. 'Jewish-Israelis' and the Ritual Connection to Diaspora Jewry," presented at the conference on "Dynamic Jewish Belonging," Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Institute for Advanced Studies, 2004.

members of the same people. In his view, Israeli Jews and American Jews, for example, live in different conceptual universes. In Israel, the Jews are fighting to remain a majority in a Jewish and democratic state; in the United States, the Jews are doing their utmost to preserve their status as an ethno-religious minority with a distinct identity in a free country. According to Arian, in the future this difference could push the two communities apart; hence it is important to keep track of Jewish Israelis' perception of the Diaspora, to identify what the two communities have in common, and to identify the reasons why they are moving farther from each other.¹⁸

Liebman advanced another notion that could enrich future surveys on the topic: drawing on the work of Asher Arian, Ilan Talmud, Tamar Hermann, and Hanna Herzog, he emphasized the deep connection between the level of religiosity of Israeli citizens and their perception of the security threats and political challenges that face the country. Religious individuals tend to be more suspicious of the Arab "other" and less likely to believe in political compromise with adherents of other faiths.¹⁹

The Guttman–AVI CHAI reports aroused great interest in the Israeli media. Most journalists tried to exploit the findings to promote their own personal agenda. Some chose to present only findings that proved that the Israeli public feels a closeness to traditional values, but not necessarily religious ones. By contrast, the religious media presented the report as fully compatible with the Orthodox and Haredi line. Articles in *Hamodi'a* and other religious media outlets stressed that a secular survey had proved the dominant role of religion in the lives of the Jews in Israel.²⁰

18 A. Arian, "On Demography and Politics in the Jewish Future," *Society* 36(4) (1999), pp. 21–26.

19 C. S. Liebman, "Cultural Conflict in Israeli Society," in: Liebman and Katz, eds., *The Jewishness of Israelis* (above n. 4).

20 Idem, "The Media and the Guttman Report," *ibid.*

Method

1. Tools

Data collection for the present survey was divided into two stages, each of which employed a different methodology. The first, qualitative stage (May 2008), involved focus groups; the second, quantitative stage (February to July 2009) was based on a public opinion poll. The qualitative tools were incorporated into the survey to make it possible to devise a valid and reliable questionnaire: the researchers themselves needed to be exposed to the up-to-date world of concepts employed by Israeli Jews when they speak about Jewish tradition. The focus groups were thus intended to enrich the research toolbox and make the current report deeper and more valid. The focus groups were organized by New Wave Research. The discussions with each group lasted approximately two and a half hours. The groups had the following sociodemographic composition:

Group 1: Secular young men and women (aged 22–30)

Group 2: Secular women (aged 35–50)

Group 3: Secular and slightly Traditional men (aged 50–65)

Group 4: Strongly Traditional men (aged 35–50)

Group 5: Orthodox men (aged 50–65)

Group 6: Secular immigrants from the former Soviet Union (aged 22–30)

The focus-group sessions were based on an outline of the topics that were raised in the same order in each group, with minor changes related to the nature of the discussion in each group. The intensity of the discussion varied from group to group. For example, the immigrants from the former Soviet Union spent a long time on conversion, a topic of scant interest to the Israeli-born secular group.

The main points that came up in the focus group sessions included the following:

1. Israel's situation in general
2. Relations among sectors of society
3. The attitude toward state institutions, with the emphasis on religious institutions
4. The functioning of the rabbinate
5. The status of women in Israel
6. "Who is a Jew" and its implications for modern Israeli society
7. The status of religion in Israel
8. Conversion
9. Social solidarity
10. The attitude toward the term "Jewish state"
11. The role of Jewish values in Israeli society
12. The elements and significance of religious behavior

Based on an analysis of the focus-group sessions, a questionnaire was drawn up with 183 items (including the demographic section).²¹ Roughly half of the non-demographic questions, 71, were carried over from the previous questionnaires, so as to permit comparison with the past findings. The other questions were devised by the researchers specifically for the current survey or taken from international surveys such as the World Values Survey and the European Social Survey, in order to include an international comparative dimension.

2. The Sample

The research population consisted of the adult Israeli Jewish population of Israel. The sample was composed of 2,803 Israeli Jews who, as of the date of the interview, had celebrated their twentieth birthday. The face-to-face interviews were conducted in Jewish population centers; the sample did not include Arabs or foreign residents who do not hold Israeli citizenship.

With relation to other non-Jewish groups (such as some of the immigrants from the former Soviet Union), one of the options for declining to participate in the survey was “not a member of the Jewish people.” In fact, the percentage of those who declined to be interviewed because they have no link to the Jewish people was nil. Nevertheless, a non-Jew who agreed to be interviewed was not filtered out by the interviewer and was given the opportunity to answer all of the questions in the survey. As a result, the sample included 24 non-Jewish respondents who are eligible for Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return (such as the spouses of Jews) and 42 respondents with a Jewish father who are not Jewish according to halakhah. Non-Jews (as defined by halakhah) accounted for 2.4% of those interviewed.

As stated, the data were collected between February and July 2009. The interviews were conducted in Hebrew or Russian. The response rate was 54%. The reasons for declining to participate broke down as follows: 6%, no one at home; 8%, no one at home over the age of 20; 7% of the potential subjects could not be interviewed in Hebrew or Russian; and 25% would not allow the interviewer inside.

The sample was based on the data of the Central Bureau of Statistics.²²

Demographic Attributes of the Three Survey Samples (1991, 1999, 2009)

The figures below display several demographic attributes of the 2009 interview sample, and a comparison with those of the 1991 and 1999 Guttman – AVI CHAI surveys. These comparisons naturally include only variables recorded in the previous years as well.

21 The questionnaire is attached as Appendix A.

22 The sample was devised on the basis of the data for the Jewish population aged 20 and above, as published in the Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2007 and 2008, and taking account of variables such as the distribution of the population by localities and countries of origin. Haredi subjects were added in order to equalize their percentage in the population with that reported in the CBS social surveys. The purging of the final data file to correspond to the figures in the Statistical Abstract, which was possible because more subjects than necessary were sampled, was done on a random basis. See Appendix B for a comparison of the sample with the data on the Jewish population in the 2007 and 2008 Statistical Abstracts.

Figures 1–4: Distribution of respondents to the Guttman–AVI CHAI surveys (percent)

Figure 1: By Gender




Figure 2: By Age




Figure 3: By Ethnic Origin*





Figure 4: By Educational Level




*The 1991 survey did not include a question about ethnic origin.

The proportion of men and women was similar in all surveys

- In the 2009 survey, respondents were slightly older than in the 1991 and 1999 surveys (a slightly higher percentage of those aged 50+).
- There was a slightly lower percentage of Ashkenazim in the 2009 survey than in 1999 and a slightly higher percentage of children of mixed parentage (both Ashkenazi and Mizrahi).
- In the 2009 survey, the percentage of subjects with university degrees was substantially higher than in the 1999 survey and especially in the 1991 survey. Correspondingly, the percentage of 2009 respondents with less than 12 years of schooling was lower than that in the 1999 and 1991 surveys.

Figure 5: Last month, the monthly income of an average four-person family in Israel was NIS 9,500 net. Is your income ...? (percent)



* The question about income was phrased differently in 1991 and 1999; hence the distribution for those years cannot be compared to that in the present survey.

- 39% of the 2009 respondents report that they earn more than the average wage.
- 34% of the 2009 respondents report that they earn less than the average wage.

Throughout the report, quantitative data analysis of data was applied to the entire sample as well as to the key background variables—religion, gender, and number of years in the country. The segmentation by background variables is presented **only** where the variable was found to be an interfering factor.


Results

Chapter 1: Religiosity and the Observance of Tradition in Israel

The present report surveys stable and changing trends in the self-defined religiosity of Jews who live in Israel for the period from 1991 to 2009, the date of the last survey. These years have seen certain changes in how Israeli Jews define their religiosity and the extent to which they observe religious tradition (see Figure 6):


Figure 6: **Distribution of self-defined religiosity and observance of tradition** (By year; percent)

How would you define yourself religiously?*



*This question was not asked in 1991.


To what extent do you observe religious tradition?



- The percentage of Israeli Jews who defined themselves as Orthodox or Haredi in 2009 exceeded the figure in 1999 (22% and 16%, respectively). Similarly, more respondents said that they observe religious tradition to a great extent (26% and 19%, respectively).
- Correspondingly, a smaller percentage of Israeli Jews defined themselves as “secular but not anti-religious” or as “anti-religious” in 2009 than did so in 1999 (46% and 52%, respectively).
- The downward trend in the percentage of Israeli Jews who say they observe religious tradition to a great extent, observed from 1991 to 1999 (apparently under the impact of the mass immigration from the former Soviet Union), no longer exists. From 1999 to 2009 there was an increase in the percentage of Israeli Jews who observe Jewish tradition to a great extent. This reversal of the trend (between 1999 and 2009) may be evidence that the immigrants from the former Soviet Union have been assimilated into Israeli society and have adopted Jewish customs and traditions; it may also reflect an increase in the demographic weight of the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox. It seems plausible that, were it not for the mass immigration from the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the increase in religious observance from 1991 to 2009 would have been linear.

Respondents' reports of changes in their sense of religiosity and religious behavior were also examined. The data indicate that more than half of Israeli Jews say that this has remained stable; almost half say that there has been some change in their sense of religiosity and religious behavior. Among those who said that there has been a change, more reported that they had moved closer to religion (more observant of the precepts, a stronger religious feeling, more study of religious texts) than moved away from it (see Figure 7).

Figure 7: **Today, as compared to the past, I ...** (2009, percent)




Closer scrutiny of these trends in different sectors of the population²³ indicates that whereas the trend to grow closer to religion is reported prominently by the Orthodox and Haredi, and to some extent by the Traditional, among the secular who are not anti-religious and especially the anti-religious there is no change or even a slight movement away from religion (see Figures 7.1–7.5). The high percentage of the Orthodox and Haredi who feel more religious seems to be responsible for the overall picture of Jewish society in Israel represented in Figure 7, where the percentage of those reporting that they now feel closer to religion than in the past exceeds that of those who reported having moved away from it (even though the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox together still constitute a minority of Israeli Jewish society, according to Figure 6). That is, the secular sector of Israeli society makes no contribution to the situation in which more people report moving toward religion than moving away from it.


23 Chi-square tests found significant differences for all the variables investigated (changes in one's feeling of religiosity, keeping kosher, observing the Sabbath, and studying *Tanakh*, Talmud, and other Jewish texts) as correlated with self-defined religiosity ($p < .001$).

Figures 7.1–7.5: Today, as compared to the past, I ... (2009; percent)


Haredi




Orthodox




Traditional



Secular, not anti-religious



Secular, anti-religious




More No change Less

It is interesting to observe that when the respondents were asked whether Israel is becoming more secular or more religious, roughly half (47%) said that Israel is becoming more secular, a quarter (27%) that there is no change, and another quarter (26%) that it is becoming more religious.

The findings are evidence of a correlation between the definition of religious identity and the degree of observance of tradition. Indeed, the Orthodox and Haredi report that they observe tradition “to a great extent” or observe it “meticulously,” while the Traditional are divided among those who observe “to a great extent” and those who observe it only “to some extent.” Even most of the secular who are not anti-religious observe tradition “to some extent,” whereas most of the anti-religious secular “do not observe tradition at all” (see Figure 8).

Figure 8: **Extent of observance of tradition by religious category (2009; percent)**



Next, self-defined religiosity and extent of observance of tradition were examined by various background groups:

- Immigrants from the former Soviet Union (1989 on), as against the rest of the population
- Ethnic groups: Mizrahim, Ashkenazim, mixed parentage (both Ashkenazim and Mizrahim)²⁴
- Education level
- Income level²⁵
- Gender
- Age cohort

24 Ethnic group was determined by respondents' answer to item 162: "What is your ethnic origin? 1. Ashkenazi; 2. Mizrahi/Sephardi; Mixed (both Ashkenazi and Sephardi); 4. Other (please specify)."

25 Income level was determined by respondents' answer to item 173: "Last month, the monthly income of an average four-person family in Israel was NIS 9,500 net. Is your income: 1. Far above the average; 2. Slightly above the average; 3. About average; 4. Slightly below the average; 5. Far below the average?"

There were statistically significant differences in self-defined religiosity and degree of observance of religious tradition between population groups (except for age cohorts)—some more significant and others less. The most salient findings were as follows:²⁶

- **Immigrants from the former Soviet Union vs. the rest of the Israeli Jewish population:**²⁷

The share of immigrants from the former Soviet Union who define themselves as secular but not anti-religious (or as secular and anti-religious) is much larger than that of the rest of the Jewish population (79% and 43%, respectively). A significantly higher proportion of the rest of the Jewish population define themselves as Traditional, Orthodox, or Haredi, as against immigrants from the former Soviet Union (56% and 22%, respectively). There is a similar trend in segmentation by the extent of observance of religious tradition.

- **Ethnic origins:** The patterns of religious self-definition and the degree of observance of religious tradition of those of mixed parentage (Ashkenazi and Mizrahi) are more like those of Ashkenazim than of Mizrahim. Most Ashkenazim (67%) and persons of mixed parentage (62%) are secular (but not anti-religious), while a few are anti-religious; by contrast, most Mizrahim are Traditional, Orthodox, or Haredi (73%).²⁸ It follows that Mizrahim define themselves as Traditional more than those of mixed parentage and Ashkenazim do (44%, 23%, and 18%, respectively). In addition, a larger proportion of Mizrahim define themselves as Orthodox or Haredi, as compared to those of mixed parentage and Ashkenazim (29%, 15%, and 17%, respectively). A similar trend was found with regard to the degree of observance of religious tradition.

- **Income:** There were statistically significant differences among income categories with regard to their self-defined religiosity and observance of religious tradition.²⁹ Most of those with an income far above the average defined themselves as secular but not anti-religious or as secular and anti-religious (62%, as against 39%–48% of other income categories). By contrast, most of those with an income below average (slightly or far below) defined themselves as Traditional, Orthodox, or Haredi (61% of the respondents in these categories). The percentage of Haredim among those with an income that is slightly or far below average exceeds the figure in the other categories (12% and 17%, respectively, as against 3% to 5% of respondents in the other categories). Similar trends were found with regard to extent of observance of tradition.

The patterns of self-defined religiosity and extent of observance of religious tradition of those with an average or slightly above-average income were quite similar: half of them are secular (whether anti-religious or not anti-religious), about a third are Traditional, and nearly one-fifth define themselves as Orthodox or Haredi.

- **Education:** There were statistically significant differences among respondents of different educational levels with regard to their self-defined religiosity and observance of religious

26 For details, see Appendix D.

27 Chi-square analysis found statistically significant differences for self-defined religiosity and extent of observance of religious tradition ($p < .001$).

28 Chi-square analysis found statistically significant differences for self-defined religiosity and extent of observance of religious tradition ($p < .001$).

29 Chi-square analysis found statistically significant differences for self-defined religiosity and extent of observance of religious tradition ($p < .001$).

tradition.³⁰ The pattern of self-defined religiosity of those with a relatively low level of education (up to 12 years of schooling) is strikingly similar: the majority define themselves as Traditional, Orthodox, or Haredi (60%). Approximately 40% define themselves as secular but not anti-religious. Only a tiny fraction (3%) see themselves as secular and anti-religious.

Most of those with more than 12 years of schooling but no university degree, too, define themselves as Traditional, Orthodox, or Haredi (18%, as against 5%–8% in the other educational categories). The proportion of Haredim in this group is relatively higher than in other groups, evidently because it includes *yeshiva* students.

Those with a university degree differ from all the other groups. Most define themselves as secular but not anti-religious, and some as secular and anti-religious (60% for the two, as against 37%–44% in the other groups).

- **Gender:** There were statistically significant differences in how women and men define their religiosity and the extent to which they observe religious tradition.³¹ More women than men defined themselves as Traditional (34% and 29%, respectively); more men than women defined themselves as Haredi (10% and 5%, respectively). Correspondingly, a larger percentage of women reported that they observe tradition to a slight or great extent (74% of women, 66% of men), while a higher percentage of men reported that they observe tradition meticulously (16% of men and 11% of women).

Chapter 2: Jewish Lifestyle and Practices

This chapter relates to the lifestyles and practices of Israeli Jews who live in Israel. The questions addressed have to do with what are considered to be traditional and religious practices as they are manifested in the respondents' accounts of their actual behavior—the observance of the Sabbath, holidays, and daily life, and celebration of religious rituals. The graphs below present the distribution of the respondents' answers to all the relevant items on the questionnaire.

The Role of Tradition in Daily Life (Figure 9)


- More than 60% of the respondents said that tradition is “very important” or “fairly important” in their choice of a spouse.
- About half of the respondents said that tradition is “very important” or “fairly important” when it comes to what they do on the Sabbath and how they behave when abroad.
- Only about a third said that tradition is important to them with regard to the number of children in the family and their choice of an occupation.

A small percentage of respondents (13%) said that they consult with a rabbi about personal problems “always” or “frequently.”

30 Chi-square analysis found statistically significant differences for self-defined religiosity and extent of observance of religious tradition ($p < .001$).

31 Chi-square analysis found statistically significant differences for self-defined religiosity ($p < .001$) and extent of observance of religious tradition ($p < .01$).


Figure 9: Respondents' report about the role of tradition in their daily lives
 (Responding "very important" or "fairly important"; 2009; percent)



Individuals and Their Social Circle

- Slightly more than half of the respondents said that religious tradition is or was observed "meticulously" or "to a great extent" in their parents' home. Slightly less than half said that they want their children to observe tradition "to a great extent" or "meticulously." Slightly more than a third said that their spouse observes religious tradition "meticulously" or "to a great extent."

Figure 10: To what extent do those close to you (now or in the past) observe tradition or would you like them to do so in the future? (Responding "meticulously" or "to a large extent"; 2009; percent)




Sabbath Observance and Customs

Approximately one-third of respondents report that they observe the Sabbath “meticulously” or “to a great extent”; half said that tradition is “very important” or “important” for what they do on the Sabbath. Figure 11 displays respondents’ answers related to Sabbath precepts and prohibitions.

- More than 80% state that they “always” or “frequently” make an effort to be with their family on the Sabbath.
- More than two-thirds say this about eating a special dinner on Friday night.
- Only about 10% say that they “always” or “frequently” work for pay on the Sabbath.
- Only about 15% report that they go shopping on the Sabbath.

Figure 11: **Sabbath practices and prohibitions** (Respondents who “always” or “frequently”... ; 2009; percent)



Next, differences with regard to the Sabbath observance were traced over the years (1991, 1999, and 2009), with the following results (see Figures 12 and 13).

- There were significant differences between 1991, 1999, and 2009 with regard to all of the active practices investigated.³² In 1999, the percentages of those who reported making *kiddush* and having a special meal on Friday night were lower than they had been in 1991. In

32 MANOVA analysis of the four variables related to active practices, found this to be statistically significant with regard to survey year ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each variable by survey year, found that all four had statistically significant effects (all of them $p < .001$).

2009, the percentages for both items were higher than the figures for both 1999 and 1991. With regard to lighting Sabbath candles, there was a decline from 1991 to 1999, followed by a rebound in 2009 to a level similar to that of 1991. The percentage of those who reported spending Friday night with their family was higher in 1999 than in 1991, and stayed at around the same level in 2009.

- There were statistically significant differences between 1999 and 2009 for most of the prohibitions investigated.³³ There was a statistically significant decline in the percentage of those who reported that they violate Sabbath prohibitions from 1999 to 2009 for three of the four variables studied (the exception is shopping on the Sabbath).

Figure 12: Customary Sabbath activities
(Respondents who “always” or “frequently” ...; 1991, 1999, 2009; percent)





Figure 13: Sabbath prohibitions
(Respondents who “always” or “frequently” ...; 1999, 2009; percent)



³³ The questions about Sabbath prohibitions were not asked in 1991. The difference between 1999 and 2009 was analyzed by MANOVA on the four variables related to prohibitions and found to be statistically significant with regard to survey year ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each variable by survey year, found that three of the four were statistically significant: “On the Sabbath do you ... go out to eat and enjoy other pastimes? Go swimming at the pool or beach or engage in other sporting activity? Watch television or listen to the radio?” ($p < .001$ for all of them).

Holiday Customs

Figures 14 and 15 present holiday customs and respondents' attitudes toward them:

- Most Israeli Jews (85%) say that it is "important" or "very important" to celebrate the Jewish holidays according to tradition. An overwhelming majority (90%) believe that it is "important" or "very important" to attend a Passover *seder*.
- A very high percentage (82%) say that they light Hanukkah candles "always" or "frequently." Smaller percentages say that it is their custom not to eat *hametz* (bread) on Passover (67%), to fast on Yom Kippur (68%), to hear the reading of the *Megillah* on Purim (36%), and to attend an all-night study session on Shavuot (20%).

Only 62% of those who said it is "important" or "very important" to attend a Passover *seder* reported that this is for religious reasons. Almost 40% said that it is for other reasons (evidently social or family-related). Statistically significant differences were found between 1999 and 2009 for most of the holiday customs that were examined:³⁴

- In 2009, there was an increase over 1999 in the percentage of those who report that they light Hanukkah candles and of those who attach great importance to celebrate the Jewish holidays in the traditional manner.
- By contrast, there was a slight decline in the percentage of those who report that they do not eat *hametz* on Passover, as well as a decline in the percentage of those who hear the public reading of the *Megillah* on Purim.

34 The questions about holiday customs were not asked in 1991. MANOVA analysis of the five variables related to holiday customs found this to be statistically significant with regard to survey year, ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each variable by survey year, found that four of them were statistically significant: "Celebrating the Jewish holidays as prescribed by religious tradition" is an "important principle guiding your life" ($p < .001$); "Do you hear the public reading of the *Megillah* on Purim?" ($p < .001$); "Do you light Hanukkah candles?" ($p < .001$); "Do you refrain from eating *hametz* on Passover?" ($p < .05$).

Figure 14: Respondents' report of the importance of observing holiday customs and actual observance (2009; percent)





Figure 15: Respondents' report of the importance of observing holiday customs (1999, 2009; percent)



Kashrut

Figure 16 presents the data on observance of kashrut. The following findings arise from the data:

- Most Israeli Jews eat kosher at home (76%) or outside the home (70%). Smaller percentages, but still a majority of Israeli Jews (63%), say that they separate meat and dairy.
- Some 72% of the respondents say that they never eat pork; another 13% say that they eat pork infrequently. A majority of those who said that they never eat pork (79%) said that they do so for religious reasons.

From 1991 and 2009 there was a statistically significant decline on the only question related to kashrut that was common to both surveys: “Do you eat kosher at home?”³⁵

Figure 16: To what extent do you observe kashrut? (2009; percent)





Figure 17: Respondents who say that they “always” or “usually” eat kosher (1991, 2009; percent)




35 Univariate ANOVA found this to be statistically significant ($p < .01$).

Jewish Lifecycle Ceremonies

Figures 18 and 19 present respondents' reports about Jewish lifecycle ceremonies.

Figure 18: Respondents for whom Jewish lifecycle ceremonies are “important” or “very important” (2009; percent)



As can be seen in Figure 18, an overwhelming majority of Israeli Jews believe that it is “important” or “very important” to conduct the major Jewish lifecycle ceremonies—circumcision, sitting *shiva*, bar mitzvah, and saying *kaddish* for one’s parents. Slightly lower percentages, though still a large majority, say the same about a Jewish burial (86%) and bat mitzvah (83%).

But even if most Israeli Jews believe that it is “important” or “very important” to be married by a rabbi (80%), they are not unambiguous about this. Only about half of Israeli Jews (54%) ruled out the possibility that they or members of their family might choose to be married in a civil ceremony, were such available in Israel; about a quarter of those interviewed stated that they were “absolutely willing” or “willing” for their children to have a civil marriage ceremony.


Most of those who said that it is “important” or “very important” to circumcise their sons, and most of those who gave the same response with regard to a bar mitzvah (79% and 69%, respectively), said that this is for religious reasons. By contrast, only half (49%) of those who said that it is “important” or “very important” to hold a bat mitzvah ceremony for a daughter believe so for religious reasons.

There were statistically significant differences among 1991, 1999, and 2009 with regard to all of the Jewish lifecycle ceremonies investigated (Figure 19):³⁶

- From 1991 to 1999, there was a decline in the percentage of those who think having a bat mitzvah for a daughter or being married by a rabbi is “important” or “very important.” The 2009 figure, however, was greater than those for both 1999 and 1991.
- With regard to the other Jewish lifecycle ceremonies, from 1991 to 1999 there was a decline in the percentage of those who believe them to be “important” or “very important,” but the 2009 level was similar to that of 1991.

There was no statistically significant difference between 1999 and 2009 for the question: “If civil marriage were available in Israel, do you believe that you or a member of your family would choose this option?”³⁷

Figure 19: Respondents for whom Jewish lifecycle ceremonies are “important” or “very important” (1991, 1999, 2009; percent)




36 MANOVA analysis of the five variables related to Jewish lifecycle rituals, by survey year, found statistically significant differences ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each variable by survey year, found statistically significant effects for all five variables ($p < .001$). (This analysis was conducted only for five variables that were identical on all three surveys: the importance of celebrating a bar mitzvah, of having a religious wedding, of burial according to Jewish tradition, of sitting *shiva*, and of saying *kaddish* for one’s parents.)

37 This question was asked in 1999 and 2009 but not in 1991.

Studying about Judaism (Figure 20)

- More than two-thirds say that it is “very important” or “important” to study the *Tanakh* (Bible), Talmud, and other Jewish texts.
- A minority of the respondents note that they are interested “a lot” or “a fair amount” in topics associated with Judaism or that they study Jewish texts—the texts themselves, on the Internet, or Jewish expressions in music.
- Similar numbers are interested in New Age, spirituality, or mysticism.
- About one-tenth of the respondents (13%) consult with a rabbi about their personal problems “always” or “frequently.”
- About one-quarter visit the graves of righteous men “frequently” or “sometimes.”

Figure 20: Respondents on studying about Judaism (2009; percent)



Jewish Lifestyle and Practices in 2009—An Overview

In order to assemble an overall picture of the Jewish lifestyles and practices that are widespread in contemporary Israeli society, we used factor analysis to reduce the long list of items surveyed in this chapter to distinct groups, each of them composed of items with a high correlation among themselves.

The type of analysis performed on the items relevant to this chapter is Principal Components Factor Analysis, with varimax rotation (to maximize the differentiation among factors).

The analysis included questions that asked respondents to report on their own observance of religious precepts and customs, as well as questions that elicited their opinion about the

importance of observing particular customs and practices.³⁸ The idea of using factor analysis was borrowed from a study by Peri Kedem, in which that statistical method was used in order to construct clusters of precepts.³⁹

Of the 56 questions in this chapter, 44 that deal with the observance of religious practices or the perceived importance of religious practices were found to be appropriate for the factor analysis and were included in its first stage. In the next stage, items that were insufficiently associated with one of the factors derived from the analysis or that were associated with more than one factor were eliminated. This left 35 items, in six stable groups, each with its own distinct meaning,⁴⁰ together they explain 68.3% of the variance in the respondents' answers to the questions in this chapter.

The statistical procedure of factor analysis grouped the precepts and customs into categories or factors that (as will be seen below) tended to be associated with self-defined religiosity (Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, secular but not anti-religious, secular and anti-religious). Commenting on Kedem's 1995 study, Yehuda Goodman and Shlomo Fischer write that "the continuum simultaneously symbolizes what is common to and what distinguishes the several groups. The use of the index of observance of the precepts substantiates popular categories for classifying the population (into the following groups: secular, Traditional, Orthodox, and Haredi)."⁴¹

The analysis produced the following factor clusters:

Factor 1, which explains most of the variance in respondents' answers (42%), comprises precepts and customs that are observed chiefly by those who define themselves as Haredi or Orthodox. These include attending synagogue, hearing the reading of the *Megillah* on Purim, attending an all-night study session on Shavuot, and observing the Sabbath. Below we will refer to this as "religious practices and customs."

Factor 2, which explains 10% of the variance, comprises precepts and customs that are widely observed by Israelis, including circumcision, bar/bat mitzvah, sitting *shiva*, and conducting a Passover *seder*. The fact that these precepts and customs are observed by people who call themselves "secular" has led scholars, such as Shelah⁴² and Liebman and Don Yehiya,⁴³ to draw a

38 Note that in this chapter the conditions for factor analysis are not optimum, because of the lack in uniformity in how the presentation of the questions and the different response scales in the original questionnaires. Nevertheless, the research team thought it appropriate to employ the method in order to obtain an overall picture about the observance of Jewish precepts and customs in Israel.

39 P. Kedem, "Dimension of Jewish Religiosity," in S. Deshen, C. Liebman, and M. Shokeid (eds.), *Israeli Judaism: The Sociology of Religion in Israel*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995), pp. 33–59.

40 For a full description of the factors and items, see Appendix C.

41 Y. Goodman and S. Fischer, "Towards an Understanding of Secular and Religious Identity in Israel: The Thesis of Secularization and Conceptual Alternatives," in Y. Yonah and Y. Goodman (eds.), *Maelstrom of Identities: A Critical Look at Religion and Secularity in Israel* (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hame'uchad, 2004) (Hebrew).

42 I. Shelah, *Indications towards Secular Religion in Israel* (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Press, 1975) (Hebrew).

43 C. S. Liebman and E. Don Yehiya, *Civil Religion in Israel: Traditional Judaism and Political Culture in the Jewish State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

distinction between “Orthodox religion” and “secular” or “civil religion.” Building on their thesis that these precepts and customs are conceptually distinct from those practiced exclusively or mainly by the ultra-Orthodox and Orthodox, we will call this cluster “civil-religious practices and customs.”

Factor 3, which explains 6% of the variance, comprises precepts and customs that are undoubtedly observed by those who define themselves as Orthodox or Haredi, but also by most of those who refer to themselves as Traditional. These include keeping kosher, fasting on Yom Kippur, and lighting the Sabbath candles and reciting the *kiddush* on Friday night. We will call this cluster “traditional practices.”

Factor 4, which explains 4% of the variance, comprises items that reflect awareness of practical-routine aspects of religion and tradition including the influence of tradition on the number of children in the family, selection of an occupation, dress, choice of a spouse, etc. We will call this group “routine-daily life decisions.”

Factor 5, which explains 3% of the variance, is observance of the Sabbath prohibitions—going shopping, working, and engaging in sports or recreational activities.

Factor 6, which explains 3% of the variance, comprises items that reflect “contemporary” interest in Judaism. They include surfing the Internet for Jewish sites, interest in New Age or mysticism, and interest in Jewish music.

Figure 21 displays the ranking of each of these factors by the average score of the answers to the items they include.⁴⁴

Figure 21: Average observance of Jewish religious precepts and customs (2009; five-point scale)



44 The items on the original questionnaire had different scales (4, 5, or 6 categories). In order to produce averages that could be compared, all of the scales were normalized to six categories: from 0, meaning no link whatsoever to religious practices, to five, for maximum attachment to religious practices.


- The highest average score (4.3) relates to the importance that Israeli Jews attach to observing lifecycle ceremonies such as circumcision, bar/bat mitzvah, saying *kaddish*, and Jewish burial, as well as attending a Passover *seder*. This is the category we designated “civil-religious practices and customs.” The high average score is evidence that these are followed by broad sections of Israeli Jews.
- A lower but still relatively high score (3.6) relates to the observance of what we called “traditional practices,” such as keeping kosher (separating meat and dairy foods and not eating pork), not eating *hametz* (bread) on Passover, lighting Sabbath candles, and reciting the *kiddush* on Friday night.
- A similar average score (3.4) was registered for observance of the Sabbath prohibitions.
- A slightly lower than average score (2.4) was registered by items related to “routine-daily life decisions,” expressed by the importance of tradition in the choice of one’s spouse, deciding the number of children in the family, how one dresses, and the choice of an occupation. This average score seems to indicate that these practices are kept by part of the population—mainly by the Haredi and Orthodox and some of the Traditional.
- A relatively low average score (1.6) was registered for the observance of religious practices and customs such as attending synagogue, hearing the reading of the *Megillah* on Purim, observing the Sabbath, and consulting with a rabbi. This rather low average score seems to indicate that these practices and customs are followed by a relatively small slice of the population—mainly the Haredi and Orthodox.
- A particularly low score (1.0) was found for “contemporary” interest in Jewish expressions in music and websites that deal with Jewish content, and to mysticism and spirituality.

Figure 22 displays the average score for each factor for each of the self-defined population groups. As expected, respondents who define themselves as more religious report a stronger attachment to the items they were asked about—religious practices and customs, routine-daily life decisions, civil-religious practices and customs, traditional practices, and observance of the Sabbath prohibitions.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, as the earlier Guttman–AVI CHAI surveys found, Israeli Jews who define themselves as secular but not anti-religious (or even as secular and anti-religious) do observe Jewish customs and practices to some small extent.⁴⁶

45 MANOVA analysis of the six factors that reflect the different degrees of attachment to Jewish practices found statistically significant differences with regard to the respondent’s religious self-definition ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each factor by the respondent’s religious self-identification, found statistically significant effects for all six ($p < .001$).

46 MANOVA analysis of the six factors that reflect the different degrees of attachment to Jewish practices found statistically significant differences with regard to the respondent’s observance of religious practices and customs ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each factor by the respondent’s religious self-identification, found statistically significant effects for all six ($p < .001$).

Figure 22: Average observance of Jewish religious precepts and customs (2009; by self-defined religiosity)



Jewish Lifestyle and Practice in 2009—By Population Group

Next, analysis of differences among population groups by other background variables revealed generally consistent differences among the groups with regard to these items. The most conspicuous were as follows:⁴⁷

- Immigrants from the former Soviet Union vs. the rest of the Israeli Jewish population:** The immigrants from the former Soviet Union are much less observant of traditional religious practices than the rest of the population in all areas of practice and lifestyle. The most prominent differences related to what we have defined as “civil-religious practices and customs,”⁴⁸ such as lifecycle ceremonies and attending a Passover *seder* (a score of 3.5 among the immigrants, as against 4.4 among the other respondents), “traditional practices” such as keeping kosher, fasting on Yom Kippur, lighting Sabbath candles, and making *kiddush* on Friday night (2.5 and 3.8, respectively), and practices and customs which we have defined as “religious” such as going to the synagogue and hearing the reading of the *Megillah* on Purim (0.9 and 1.6, respectively).

47 For details, see Appendix D.

48 MANOVA analysis of the six factors that reflect the different degrees of attachment to Jewish religious practices, found statistically significant differences between immigrants from the FSU and the rest of the population ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each factor, comparing immigrants from the FSU with the rest of the population, found statistically significant effects for all six ($p < .001$).

- **Ethnic origins:** Respondents of Mizrahi background report greater observance of all the “traditional practices” investigated than did other respondents.⁴⁹ The difference was particularly prominent with regard to what we defined as “religious practices and customs” (average of 2.1 for Mizrahi respondents, 1.1 for Ashkenazim and those of mixed parentage), and “routine-daily life decisions” 2.9 for Mizrahi respondents, 2.0–2.1 for Ashkenazim and those of mixed parentage).
- **Income:** There is an almost linear correlation between income level and the link to traditional and religious practices in all six domains: the lower a respondent’s income, the stronger the attachment to religious practices and lifestyles, and vice versa.⁵⁰

Chapter 3: Religious Beliefs and Social Values

This chapter deals with the religious beliefs and values of Jews in Israel. The questions in this chapter relate to belief in a higher power, the Jewish religion, social values, and attitudes about the status of women in Israel.


Religious Belief (Figure 23)

- An overwhelming majority of respondents believe in God, that they will be rewarded for good actions and punished for misdeeds, and in the power of prayer.
- About two-thirds also reported a strong belief in the unique character of the Jewish people and the Torah.
- About half of the respondents reported that they believe in the World to Come and the Messiah.
- Only about a third reported a strong belief that a Jew who does not observe the precepts endangers the entire Jewish people.

49 MANOVA analysis of the six factors that reflect the different degrees of attachment to Jewish religious practices found statistically significant differences with regard to ethnic origin ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each factor by ethnic origin, found statistically significant effects for all six ($p < .001$).

50 MANOVA analysis of the six factors that reflect the different degrees of attachment to Jewish religious practices found statistically significant differences with regard to income level ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each factor by income, found statistically significant effects for all six ($p < .001$).

Figure 23: **To what extent do you believe or not believe that...** (Answering “believe wholeheartedly” or “believe but sometimes doubt”; 2009; percent)




Differences across the three surveys (1991, 1999, 2009) with regard to belief in a higher power and the Jewish religion were examined. Two main trends were discovered (see Figure 24):⁵¹

- With regard to universal religious beliefs—belief in a higher power that directs the world, in reward and punishment for good and bad actions, or in life after death—there was a slight but statistically significant rise in the percentage of believers in 2009 as compared to the 1999 and 1991 surveys.
- With regard to specifically Jewish beliefs—the coming of the Messiah, the uniqueness of the Jewish people, or the notion that a Jew who does not observe the precepts endangers the entire Jewish people—there was a decline in the percentage of believers in 1999 as compared to 1991, but this decline was “corrected” in 2009 and the figure returned to the 1991 level.

51 MANOVA analysis of the eight statements dealing with religious belief, found statistically significant differences with regard to survey year ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each of the statements, found statistically significant effects by survey year for eight of the statements (all of them $p < .001$).

Figure 24: **To what extent do you believe or not believe that...** (Answering “believe wholeheartedly” or “believe but sometimes doubt”; 1991, 1999, 2009; percent)




Social Values (Figure 25)

Most Israeli Jews (71%) say that their lifestyle is based on the spirit of Jewish values (“absolutely yes” or “yes”). Following are respondents’ answers to the relevant questions:

- An overwhelming majority of respondents believe that it is important to pursue social justice, but agree that today most people are concerned only about themselves. More than two-thirds think that making money is “very important” or “fairly important.”
- About two-thirds of respondents say that tradition exerts an important influence on their attitudes about social welfare and assistance to those in need; but only a third say that it influences their stand on environmental issues.


Figure 25: Respondents' positions on social values (2009; percent)



The Status of Women

- Most Israeli Jews (63%) believe that the status of women in Israel should be changed. Even more (74%) are opposed to the idea that the husband should be the sole breadwinner and the wife should stay at home to take care of the family and house. More than half (57%) agree that a women can fulfill herself even without children.

Figure 26: Respondents' views about the status of women (2009; percent)



Religious Faith and Social Values in 2009—By Background Groups

As in the previous chapter, a factor analysis was conducted to reduce the list of questions to distinct groups, each of which comprises items with a strong correlation among themselves.

Once again we conducted a Principal Components Factor Analysis with varimax rotation (to maximize the differentiation among the factors). Most of the questions in the chapter (18 in total) were included in the factor analysis. Next, items that were insufficiently grouped with one of the factors produced by the analysis or that were linked to more than one factor were removed from the factor analysis. This left 14 items, in three groups.⁵² The first factor aggregates all of the statements related to belief in a higher power and in the Jewish religion. This factor includes ten items, such as “do you believe or not believe that there is a higher power that directs the world?” and “do you believe or not believe that the Torah and precepts are God-given?” This explains 51% of the variance in the respondents’ answers to the questions in this chapter.

This factor is stable, with a unique and distinct meaning. By contrast, the other two factors identified are not theoretically or statistically coherent and distinct. For this reason, and also because the content worlds represented by these factors (social attitudes and the status of women) are not at the focus of the survey, only reports related to the first factor are presented here. Nevertheless, several interesting points related to individual items of the other two content worlds are mentioned as well.

The average score of the answers to the items associated with the first factor is 2 (on scale ranging from 0 for no belief to 3 for total belief). Consequently one can say that Israeli Jews believe but doubt sometimes.

Variations in religious belief among the different population groups were analyzed next:


- Groups constituted by self-defined religiosity—Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional, secular not anti-religious, and secular anti-religious
- Groups constituted by the degree of observance of religious tradition—meticulous, observant to a great extent, observant to some extent, not at all observant
- Immigrants from the former Soviet Union as against the rest of the population.
- Ethnic group: Mizrahim, Ashkenazim, mixed parentage (both Ashkenazi and Mizrahi)
- Education level
- Income level
- Gender
- Age cohort

52 For a full description of the factors and items associated with each, see Appendix B.

Variations between Background Groups with Regard to Religious Belief
(for details, see Appendix D)

- Variations between groups by self-defined religiosity and observance of religious tradition: As expected, Haredi and Orthodox respondents reported stronger religious belief than the Traditional, and the Traditional than the secular (there was no statistically significant difference between the Haredi and the Orthodox). A similar trend was found in the segmentation of the population by the degree of observance of religious tradition (see Figures 27 and 28).⁵³

Figures 27 and 28: **Average score for religious belief** (2009)



- **Immigrants from the former Soviet Union vs. the rest of the Israeli Jewish population:** The immigrants from the former Soviet Union report a weaker religious faith than the rest of the population (average scores of 1.6 and 2.1, respectively).⁵⁴

⁵³ Univariate ANOVA, conducted on the factor that reflects belief in a higher power and in the Jewish religion (separately for each independent variable), found statistically significant differences with regard to self-defined religiosity and extent of observance of religious traditions ($p < .001$).

⁵⁴ Univariate ANOVA, conducted on the factor reflecting religious belief, found statistically significant differences between immigrants from the FSU and the rest of the population ($p < .001$).

- **Ethnic origins:** Respondents of Mizrahi background reported the strongest religious faith; those of mixed parentage reported a belief slightly stronger than those of Ashkenazi origin (average scores of 2.4, 1.8, and 1.6, respectively).⁵⁵
- **Income:** Lower income correlates with stronger religious belief (average score of 2.2 for those with an income far below the average, and of 1.6 for those with an income far above the average).⁵⁶
- **Education:** Those with less education report stronger religious faith (average score of 2.2 for those with 0 to 11 years of schooling, and of 1.7 for those with a university degree).⁵⁷

Differences with Regard to Social Values, by Self-defined Religiosity and Observance of Religious Tradition

Even though the issue is not at the core of the survey, positions on social values were analyzed for the several background groups. The percentages of Haredi and Orthodox respondents who reported that it is important to make a lot of money were much lower than among other respondents.⁵⁸ The percentages of Haredi, Orthodox, and Traditional respondents who attached importance to social justice were slightly higher than for secular not anti-religious and anti-religious respondents⁵⁹ (even though the vast majority of all respondents in all groups asserted the importance of social justice). Similar trends were found with regard to respondents who observe religious tradition to a great extent as against those who do not observe the religious tradition at all (see Figures 29 and 30).

55 Univariate ANOVA, conducted on the factor reflecting religious belief, found statistically significant differences with regard to ethnic origin ($p < .001$).


56 Univariate ANOVA, conducted on the factor reflecting religious belief found statistically significant differences with regard to income level ($p < .001$).

57 Univariate ANOVA, conducted on the factor reflecting religious belief, found statistically significant differences with regard to educational level ($p < .001$).

58 Univariate ANOVA of the question (conducted separately for each independent variable) found statistically significant differences with regard to religious self-identification and extent of observance of religious tradition ($p < .001$).

59 Univariate ANOVA of the question (conducted separately for each independent variable), found statistically significant differences with regard to religious self-identification and extent of observance of religious tradition ($p < .001$).

Figures 29 and 30: Respondents who say it is “very important” or “fairly important” to make money or aspire to social justice (2009; percent)



Analysis of respondents' answers about their view on the status of women in Israeli society, by self-defined religiosity, showed that more-religious respondents expressed more conservative stands than did less-religious respondents.⁶⁰ A similar trend was found for respondents who observe religious tradition to a great extent as against those who do not observe it at all (see Figures 31 and 32).

⁶⁰ MANOVA analyses of the three questions related to attitudes about the status of women in Israeli society found statistically significant differences with regard to the respondent's religious self-identification and extent of observance of Jewish tradition (each separately) ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each factor, found statistically significant effects of the respondent's religious self-identification for all four of them ($p < .001$).

Figure 31: Attitudes about the status of women (By self-defined religiosity; 2009; percent)





Figure 32: Attitudes about the status of women (By extent of observance of tradition; 2009; percent)



Chapter 4: Religion and Tradition in the Public Sphere and Israeli Democracy

This chapter presents respondents' attitudes and opinions concerning religion, state, society, and politics; their interest or curiosity in matters of religion and state; their positions on the relations between religion and state; their view of the place of religion in the public sphere; and the association between religiosity on the one hand and political positions and social relations (between religious and secular Jews) on the other.

Attitudes about Expressions of Tradition and Religion in the Public Sphere in Israel


Most Israeli Jews (61%) believe that the State of Israel should ensure that public life is conducted according to Jewish religious tradition; a majority (71%) are "in favor" or "absolutely in favor" of more Judaic studies in the State (secular) schools. About half of all Israeli Jews believe that the religious element in public life in Israel today is at the appropriate level; 24% believe that there should be more religion and 28% believe that there should be less religion.

Most Israeli Jews are "interested" or "very interested" in the role of religion in the State of Israel (65% of respondents) and in the meaning of "a Jewish state" (70% of respondents).

The attitude of Israeli Jews to Sabbath and *kashrut* observance in the public sphere and to the introduction of civil marriage was investigated.

- Most Israeli Jews support weekday activities on the Sabbath in the public sphere. Roughly two-thirds of respondents are in favor of the operation of movie theaters, cafes and restaurants, and sporting events; more than half are in favor of public transportation and opening shopping centers on the Sabbath.
- An overwhelming majority (87%) of respondents believe that the food served in public institutions should be kosher. But less than half (45%) are of the opinion that the rabbinate should refuse to grant a *kashrut* certificate to institutions that observe *kashrut* but do not observe other precepts or customs.
- Roughly half of the respondents believe that civil marriage should be introduced in the country, outside the rabbinate (51% answered "yes, absolutely yes," "yes," or "perhaps yes"). One-fifth of respondents (19%) said that rabbinic courts take a pertinent and neutral position in matters of marriage and divorce; 43% said that they favor men; and 8% said that they favor women (the rest said that sometimes they favor one and sometimes the other).

Figure 33: Are you in favor of the operation of the following on the Sabbath
(Responding “in favor” or “strongly in favor”; 2009; percent)




Attitudes about Expressions of Tradition and Religion in the Public Sphere in Israel—By Year

The trends over the years (1991, 1999, 2009) in attitudes about expressions of tradition and religion in the public sphere in Israel were examined. Statistically significant differences were found for all of the items investigated in all three surveys.⁶¹ Except for the general question, “Do you believe that the State of Israel should ensure that public life is conducted according to Jewish religious tradition?” where there was a significant uptrend from 1991 to 2009 (44% support in 1991, 61% support in 2009), all the other questions displayed a trend consistent with the other findings of the report—a decline in Traditional and Orthodox positions from 1991 to 1999, followed by a rise from 1999 to 2009 (see Figure 34).


⁶¹ MANOVA analysis of the six statements that related to manifestations of tradition and religion in the Israeli public sphere and that were asked in all three surveys found statistically significant differences with regard to survey year ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each of the statements, found statistically significant effects of the survey year for all six statements ($p < .001$).

Figure 34: **Positions on manifestations of tradition and religion in the public sphere** (1991, 1999, 2009; percent)



For questions that were asked in 1999 and 2009 only (but not in 1991), there was an increase in Traditional and Orthodox positions⁶² on expressions of Jewish religion and tradition in the public sphere in Israel (see Figure 35).

Figure 35: **Are you in favor of...?** (Answering “strongly in favor” or “in favor”; 1999, 2009; percent)




62 MANOVA analysis of the three statements that related to manifestations of tradition and religion in the Israeli public sphere and that were asked only in 1999 and 2009 found statistically significant differences, with regard to survey year ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each of the statements, found statistically significant effects of the survey year, for all three statements ($p < .001$).

Attitudes about Expressions of Tradition and Religion in the Public Sphere in Israel—By Population Group

In general, there was a correlation between the degree to which respondents defined themselves as religious and strongly observant of tradition and their interest in the place of Judaism in Israel and in the meaning of the phrase “Jewish state.”⁶³ Nevertheless, the Haredim are less interested in these questions than are the Orthodox (see Figures 36 and 37).

Figures 36 and 37: **Interest in the role of Judaism in Israel** (Responding “interested” or “very interested”; 2009; percent)




63 MANOVA analyses of the two questions with regard to religious self-definition and extent of observance of Jewish tradition (for each background variable separately) found statistically significant differences ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each of variable (for each background variable separately) found statistically significant effects of religious self-definition and observance of Jewish tradition for all three ($p < .001$).

The variation in acceptance of the expression of tradition and religion in the public sphere among the different population groups was also investigated. To this end, an average was computed for the answers to all of the questions in the subchapter whose scales make such averaging possible (10 of the 12 questions presented above).⁶⁴ This produced an index that reflects respondents' views about expressions of tradition and religion in the public sphere in Israel, on a scale of 0 to 5, where the average is 2.5.

As expected, there was a linear correlation between the degree of religiosity and traditional observance and support for shaping public life to accord to religious tradition: more-observant and more-religious respondents expressed greater support⁶⁵ (See Figure 38).

Figure 38: Average agreement with expressions of religion and tradition in the public sphere
(By self-defined religiosity and extent of observance of tradition; 2009)



64 To determine whether all the questions represent the same content world, Cronbach's alpha was calculated for each, and was found to be very high: $\alpha = .92$. In addition, the answers of each item were normalized to a scale of 0 to 5 (where 0 represents total disagreement that public life in Israel should be molded by religious tradition, and 5 represents total agreement).

65 Univariate ANOVA, conducted on the index that represents respondents' position on manifestations of religion and tradition in the public arena in Israel (for each background variable separately) found statistically significant differences by religious self-definition and observance of Jewish tradition ($p < .001$).

Finally, when the differences between population groups were studied by other background variables, differences among the groups were identified. The most prominent findings were as follows:⁶⁶

- **Immigrants from the former Soviet Union vs. the rest of the Israeli Jewish population:** Immigrants from the former Soviet Union are less accepting of manifestations of tradition and religion in the public sphere than the rest of the population (average score of 1.6 and 2.5, respectively).⁶⁷
- **Ethnic origins:** Mizrahi respondents are more accepting of expressions of tradition in the public sphere (average score 3.0) than are other respondents (mixed parentage, 2.1; Ashkenazim, 1.9).⁶⁸
- **Income:** The more an Israeli earns, the less he or she supports manifestations of religion and tradition in the public sphere (average score of 1.6 for those who make far above the average to 2.2 among those who make far below the average).⁶⁹
- **Education:** Respondents with a university education are less supportive of manifestations of religion and tradition in the public sphere than the rest of the population (average score of 1.6 for holders of university degrees, as against 2.0–2.2 for the other categories).⁷⁰

66 For details of the findings, see Appendix D.

67 Univariate ANOVA, conducted on this statement found statistically significant differences between immigrants from the FSU and other Israelis ($p < .001$).

68 Univariate ANOVA conducted on this statement found statistically significant differences by ethnic origin ($p < .001$).


69 Univariate ANOVA conducted on this statement found statistically significant differences by income ($p < .001$).

70 Univariate ANOVA, conducted on this statement found statistically significant differences with regard to educational level ($p < .001$).

Attitudes about Democracy and its Relationship to Tradition and Religion

Israeli Jews' attitudes about the relationship between halakhah and democratic principles were investigated. A majority of respondents (73%) believe that Israel can be both a Jewish state that complies with halakhah as well as a democratic state. A similar percentage reported that they are interested or very interested in this matter. However, less than half of all respondents (44%) said that, where there is a contradiction between halakhah and democratic principles, democracy should always be given preference over halakhah (20% believe that halakhah should always be given preference; 36% believe sometimes one and sometimes the other). (See Figure 39.)


Figure 39: **If there is a contradiction between halakhah and democratic principles, which should be given preference?** (2009; percent)



Attitudes about Democracy and its Relationship to Tradition and Religion— By Population Group

To the question of whether Israel can be both a Jewish state that observes halakhah as well as a democratic state, most Orthodox and Traditional respondents, who observe Jewish tradition to a great extent, answered in the affirmative. Fewer secular and Haredi respondents (who are meticulous about observing every point of tradition) believe so. Only a third of the anti-religious respondents answered this question in the affirmative.⁷¹ (See Figures 40 and 41.)

Figures 40 and 41: **Can Israel be both a Jewish state that observes halakhah and a democratic state?** (Answering “absolutely” or “absolutely yes”; 2009; percent)




Religious respondents and those who observe religious tradition to a greater extent are more likely to believe that halakhah should always be given preference over democracy when there is a contradiction between the two, as opposed to the less religious respondents who observe tradition to a slight extent (see Figures 42 and 43).⁷²

71 Univariate ANOVA conducted on this statement (for each background variable separately) found statistically significant differences by religious self-identification and extent of observance of Jewish tradition (each of them $p < .001$).

72 Univariate ANOVA conducted on this statement found statistically significant differences by religious self-definition and extent of observance of Jewish tradition (both of them $p < .001$).

Figures 42 and 43: **If there is a contradiction between halakhah and democratic principles, which should take precedence?** (2009; percent)



Attitudes about Relations between the Religious and the Secular

More than half of the respondents (55%) believe that relations between the religious and nonreligious in Israel “are not so good” or “not at all good”; a majority (59%) have few if any close friends who differ with regard to their observance of the precepts (more religious or less religious than they are). Nevertheless, most (75%) agree “strongly” or “to some extent” for their children to attend a school that enrolls both secular and religious children.

There was fairly sweeping agreement about the controversial issue of the conscription of *yeshiva* students. Some 85% of respondents “agree” or “totally agree” that *yeshiva* students should be conscripted for military service.


Attitudes about Relations between the Religious and the Secular—By Year

It is possible to investigate trends over the years only with regard to the general question of relations between the religious and the secular. There was a decline in the percentage of respondents who believe that the relations between the religious and nonreligious are “fairly good” or “very good” from 1991 to 1999, followed by a significant increase in these categories in 2009 (29% in 1991, 17% in 1999, 43% in 2009).⁷³

Attitudes about Relations between the Religious and the Secular—By Population Group

The variation in positions on whether *yeshiva* students should be conscripted for military service, by self-defined religiosity and observance of religious tradition, were examined. As might be expected, Haredi respondents evinced the least agreement; a significantly larger percentage of Orthodox respondents believe they should be. Traditional and secular respondents are even more supportive of the conscription of *yeshiva* students.⁷⁴ A similar trend can be found in the segmentation by the extent of observance of tradition (see Figures 44 and 45).⁷⁵

Figures 44 and 45: **Should *yeshiva* students be conscripted for military service?** (By self-defined religiosity and extent of observance of tradition; respondents who “agree” or “totally agree”; 2009; percent)



73 Univariate ANOVA conducted on this statement found statistically significant differences by survey year ($p < .001$).

74 Univariate ANOVA conducted on this statement found statistically significant differences by religious self-identification ($p < .001$).

75 Univariate ANOVA conducted on this statement found statistically significant differences by extent of observance of religious tradition ($p < .001$).

Chapter 5: Jewish and Israeli Identity

This chapter deals with questions related to Jewish and Israeli identity, support for the Law of Return, attitudes about “who is a Jew” and the legitimacy of the various streams in Judaism, and the sense of a shared Jewish destiny and of a bond between Israel and the Diaspora.


Attitudes about the Law of Return and “Who is a Jew”

Many Israeli Jews are interested in the issue of “who is a Jew” (62% of respondents are “interested” or “very interested”). Orthodox respondents expressed the greatest interest in this issue followed by Haredi respondents and Traditional respondents (86%, 79%, and 72%, respectively). Secular and anti-religious respondents expressed significantly lower curiosity about it (47% and 20%, respectively).⁷⁶

Israeli Jews’ support for the Law of Return, in its current format, is not uniform. Although a vast majority (87%) “support” or “totally support” allowing Jews to immigrate to Israel and receive Israel citizenship immediately, only about half (53%) support this for the non-Jewish spouses of Jews, and even fewer (43%) for non-Jewish grandchildren of only one Jewish grandfather (see Figure 46).

Note that Israeli Jews’ support for allowing Jews to immigrate to Israel and receive citizenship immediately is across the board, with no variation among different population groups.

Figure 46: Respondents who “support” or “totally support” allowing immigration to Israel and immediate acquisition of Israeli citizenship for... (2009, percent)




76 Univariate ANOVA, conducted on this statement found statistically significant differences by religious self-identification ($p < .001$).

There was broad agreement with the notion that a Jew can be a good Jew even if he or she does not observe religious tradition (92% of respondents). Smaller percentages, although still a majority of Israeli Jews (61%), “agree” or “totally agree” that the Conservative and Reform movements should have equal status with the Orthodox in Israel. Note that most Israeli Jews (69%) have never attended any service or ceremony in a Reform or Conservative synagogue.

Thus, one could say that a majority of Israeli Jews (73%) accept the official position that Orthodox conversion is the path leading to recognition of a person’s Jewishness (even if he or she does not observe the precepts). Fewer (48%) accept non-Orthodox conversion. Correspondingly, most Israeli Jews do not recognize the Jewishness of a person who feels Jewish even though his or her parents are not Jews (see Figure 47).

Figure 47: **Do you consider a person to be Jewish if he/she...** (Responding in the affirmative; 2009; percent)




Sense of Belonging and Individual Identity—Israeli and Jewish

The survey found that most Israeli Jews have a strong sense of membership in and attachment to the State of Israel and the Jewish people. The vast majority say it is important to live in Israel and to feel that one is part of the Jewish people and Israeli society. Correspondingly, almost all believe that it is “fairly important” or “very important” to remember the Holocaust (see Figure 48).

Most respondents (88%) would like to live in Israel in the long term (answering “certainly yes” or “yes but not certain”); a similar percentage (84%) consider themselves to be Zionists (“absolutely yes” or “yes”).


Figure 48: **Guiding principles of respondents' lives** (Responding "fairly important" or "very important"; 2009; percent)



Smaller though still large percentages would like to be born as Jews and Israelis if given the choice (79% would "certainly" or "to some extent" like to be born as Jews; 71%, as Israelis).


Half of all Israeli Jews define themselves first and foremost as Jews; 40%, as Israelis. Fewer than ten percent of respondents define themselves primarily by their ethnic community or religiosity (see Figure 49).

Figure 49: **Which of these terms best defines your identity?** (2009; percent)



As might be expected, those who are secular but not anti-religious or are secular and anti-religious define themselves chiefly as Israeli; whereas Traditional, Orthodox, and Haredi respondents define themselves chiefly as Jews. But roughly one-third of the secular who are not anti-religious define themselves as Jews, and one-third of the Traditional define themselves as Israeli.

Figure 50: **Which of these terms best defines your identity?** (By self-defined religiosity; percent)



Sense of Belonging and Individual Identity, Israeli and Jewish— 1991, 1999, and 2009


Differences over the years in the sense of belonging and individual identification as Israeli and Jewish, as reflected in the 2009 survey and previous surveys were investigated.⁷⁷

There was no change from 1999 to 2009 in respondents' desire to be born as Jews or as Israelis, were they given the choice to be born again.⁷⁸ Nor was there any difference between 1999 and 2009 in perceptions of the importance of living in Israel.

77 The trends among all three surveys (1991, 1999, and 2009) were studied for the following items: (1) Living in Israel is an "important principle guiding your life" and (2) Feeling part of the Jewish people is an "important principle guiding your life." The trends from 1999 to 2009) were studied for the following items: (1) "If you could be born a second time, would you want to be born a Jew?" and (2) "If you could be born a second time, would you want to be born an Israeli?"

78 MANOVA analysis of these two questions found no statistically significant differences by survey year.

Figure 51: **Guiding principles of respondents' lives** (Responding "fairly important" or "very important"; 1991, 1999, 2009; percent)




There was a small but statistically significant decline from 1991 to 1999 in the perceptions of the importance of living in Israel and the sense of being part of the Jewish people. There was a slight increase from 1999 to 2009 in the sense of being part of the Jewish people.⁷⁹

The Bond between Israel and the Diaspora

The overwhelming majority of respondents feel that they are part of world Jewry (93% replied "yes" or "absolutely yes"). A majority (81%) also "agree" or "totally agree" that without the Jewish religion the Jewish people would no longer exist. Smaller percentages, although still a majority, believe that the Israeli Jews and Diaspora Jews have a shared destiny (73% replied "yes" or "absolutely yes"). Nevertheless, more than half of the respondents "agree" or "totally agree" that the Jews in Israel are a different nation than the Jews abroad.

⁷⁹ MANOVA analysis of these two questions found statistically significant differences by survey year ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each of the statements, found statistically significant effects by survey year for both statements ($p < .001$ in each case).

Figure 52: Attitudes about the bond between Israel and the Diaspora (1991, 1999, 2009; percent)



The Bond between Israel and the Diaspora—1991, 1999, and 2009


The variation over the years (1991, 1999, 2009) in attitudes about the bond between Israel and the Diaspora were examined; statistically significant differences were found in all cases,⁸⁰ similar to the trends reported in the other areas studied in the present report. From 1991 to 1999 there was a certain retreat in the sense of solidarity with the international Jewish collective; this was followed by an uptrend from 1999 to 2009. The latter is especially significant with regard to the statement that the Jews in Israel are a different nation than the Jews outside Israel, as well as the statement that Jews in Israel and Jews in the Diaspora have a shared destiny (see Figure 52).

80 MANOVA analysis of the three statements related to respondents' positions on the bond between Israel and the Diaspora by survey year found statistically significant differences ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each of the statements, found statistically significant effects by survey year for all three statements ($p < .001$ in each case).

The Bond between Israel and the Diaspora—By Self-defined Religiosity and Extent of Observance of Religious Tradition


More-religious respondents report a stronger sense of a bond between the Jews in Israel and Jews in the Diaspora. A similar trend was found for the segmentation by extent of observance of religious tradition (see Figures 53 and 54).⁸¹

Figure 53: Attitudes about the bond between Israel and the Diaspora (By self-defined religiosity; 2009; percent)



81 MANOVA analyses of the three statements related to respondents' positions on the bond between Israel and the Diaspora (separately for each of the independent variables) found statistically significant differences with regard to religious self-definition and extent of observance of tradition ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each of the statements, found statistically significant effects for religious self-definition for all three statements ($p < .001$ in each case).

Figure 54: **Attitudes about the bond between Israel and the Diaspora** (By extent of observance of religious tradition; 2009; percent)



Jewish and Israeli Identity in 2009—An Overview


As in the earlier chapters, a factor analysis was conducted to reduce the list of questions to distinct groups, each of which comprises items with a strong correlation among themselves.

The type of analysis performed is Principal Components Factor Analysis, with varimax rotation (to maximize the differentiation among factors). All of the questions in the chapter (25) were included in the factor analysis, except for eight where the answers were not on a vertical scale; this left 17 items. Next, items that were insufficiently grouped with one of the factors produced by the analysis or that were linked to more than one factor were removed from the factor analysis. This left 11 items, in two stable groups, each with its own distinct meaning,⁸² which together explain 51.3% of the variance in the respondents' answers to the questions in this chapter. The division by factors produced by this analysis is as follows:⁸³

82 For a complete description of the factors and items, see Appendix C.

83 For an analysis of the links between each of the factors discovered and respondents' self-defined religiosity and their extent of observance of Jewish tradition, see below.

Figure 55: Average agreement with factors that express attitudes about Jewish and Israeli identity (On a scale of 0 to 4; 2009)*



* The items on the original questionnaire used different scales. In order to create comparable averages the scales were stretched to cover five levels, from 0=no support for the position in question through 4=maximum support.

Factor 1: Belonging to Israel and the Jewish people. This group contained the following items: "Do you see yourself as a Zionist?" and "is feeling part of the Jewish people an important principle guiding your life?"

Factor 2: Orthodox attitudes about "who is a Jew." This contained items such as: "Do you support permitting the non-Jewish spouse of a Jew to immigrate to Israel and receive Israeli citizenship immediately?" "Should the Conservative and the Reform movements have equal status in Israel with the Orthodox?"

An analysis of the data reveals that respondents have a strong attachment to the State of Israel, to Zionism, and to Judaism—an average of 3.3 (on a scale of 0 to 4), and an ambivalent attitude about the Orthodox position on "who is a Jew"—an average of 1.9. The fact that the variables related to the attachment to Israel and to the attachment to Judaism are associated with the same factor (Factor 2) indicates that there is a very high correlation between them in the population as a whole.


Jewish and Israeli Identity, 2009—By Self-defined Religiosity and Extent of Observance of Jewish Tradition

The data indicate an almost linear correlation between the sense of belonging to Israel, Zionism, and the Jewish people, on the one hand, and self-defined religiosity and extent of observance of religious tradition, on the other. The Orthodox express greater attachment to these three than

do the secular and anti-religious secular; but the Haredim rank their sense of belonging lower than the Orthodox do.⁸⁴

An even clearer linear correlation, as well as significant variations between the secular on the one hand and the Orthodox and Haredim on the other, were found with regard to the Orthodox position on “who is a Jew,” as reflected in the lack of agreement with the automatic grant of Israeli citizenship to the non-Jewish spouse of a Jew or a person with only one Jewish grandfather, and the agreement that the Conservative and Reform movements should have parity with the Orthodox in Israel. As could be expected, support for Orthodox attitudes increases with self-defined religiosity and stricter observance of religious precepts (see Figures 56 and 57).

Figures 56 and 57: Average agreement with factors that express attitudes about Jewish and Israeli identity (2009)



84 MANOVA analysis of the two factors relevant to Jewish and Israeli identity (separately for each independent variable) were statistically significant for the respondent’s religious self-identification and extent of observance of religious tradition ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each factor found statistically significant effects by the respondent’s religious self-identification ($p < .001$ in all cases).

The differences between population groups were studied next. Differences between the groups were found on most of these issues. The most conspicuous findings were as follows:⁸⁵

- Both the sense of belonging to Israel and to the Jewish people and support for the Orthodox position about “who is a Jew” are lower among immigrants from the former Soviet Union than among the rest of the population⁸⁶ (belonging to Israel and the Jewish people, average of 3.0 among recent immigrants and 3.4 among others; Orthodox position on “who is a Jew,” average of 1.2 among recent immigrants and 2.0 among the others).
- The sense of belonging to Israel and the Jewish people is stronger among Mizrahim than among Ashkenazim and those of mixed parentage. So is support for the Orthodox position on “who is a Jew”⁸⁷ (belonging to Israel and the Jewish people, average of 3.5 among Mizrahim and 3.2 among other respondents; Orthodox attitudes on “who is a Jew,” average of 2.3 among Mizrahim and 1.6–1.7 among the others).
- Support for the Orthodox position on “who is a Jew” is lower among those with university degrees than among the rest of the population (1.7 and 2.0–2.2, respectively).⁸⁸

85 For more details, see Appendix D.

86 MANOVA analysis of the two factors relevant to Jewish and Israeli identity found statistically significant differences between immigrants from the FSU and the rest of the population ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each factor, found statistically significant effects for both of them ($p < .001$ in each case).

87 MANOVA analysis of the two factors relevant to Jewish and Israeli identity found statistically significant differences by ethnic origin ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each factor found statistically significant effects of ethnic origin for both of them ($p < .001$ in each case).

88 MANOVA analysis of the two factors relevant to Jewish and Israeli identity found statistically significant differences with regard to educational level ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each factor, found statistically significant effects for educational level for both factors ($p < .001$ in each case).

Appendix A: The Survey Questionnaire

Jewish Religious Behavior in Israel, 2008

Sticker: Serial number: 0001

Address:

City:

Instructions to the interviewer

You are to interview a person aged 20 or over in the family and at the address listed on the sticker. If they decline to open the door for you, select another apartment on the same floor. If there is no other apartment on the same floor, select an apartment on the closest floor. If there is no such address, conduct the interview in an adjacent building on the same side of the street or neighborhood.

"Hello, my name is _____. We are conducting a survey about Judaism. The interview will take about an hour. May I interview a member of the family?"

In the home where you conduct the interview, write down the names of all those present during the interview, from oldest to youngest.

1. Age	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0
1.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2.	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
3.	3	3	2	2	1	3	2	3	1	2
4.	4	1	3	4	3	1	2	2	1	2
5.	1	1	5	3	2	2	4	5	4	1
6.	6	4	1	5	4	1	2	6	3	5

2. Interviewee's address: _____

3. Interviewee's name: _____

4. Telephone: _____ Interviewer's name: _____

5. In your opinion, is Israel's general situation good or bad?

1. Very good 2. Good 3. Neither good nor bad 4. Not good 5. Not good at all

6. Are you interested in questions that have to do with the role of religion in Israel?

1. Very interested 2. Interested 3. Not very interested 4. Not at all interested

7. Israel is defined as a Jewish state. Different people ascribe different meanings to the term "Jewish state." In your opinion, what is the most important and essential attribute of a Jewish state? _____

8. To what extent are you interested in the meaning of the term “Jewish state”?

1. Very interested 2. Interested 3. Not very interested 4. Not at all interested

9. To what extent are you interested in the issue of “who is a Jew”?

1. Very interested 2. Interested 3. Not very interested 4. Not at all interested

10. Do you consider a person born to a Jewish father and non-Jewish mother to be Jewish?

1. Yes 2. No

And what about ...	Jewish	Not Jewish
11. A person converted by the rabbinate who does not observe the religious precepts?	1	2
12. A person who feels Jewish but whose parents are not?	1	2
13. A person converted by a non-Orthodox rabbi?	1	2

14. Do you believe that the State of Israel should ensure that public life is conducted according to Jewish religious tradition?

1. The State absolutely should ensure this.
 2. Perhaps it should ensure this.
 3. Perhaps it should not ensure this.
 4. The State absolutely should not ensure this.

15. With regard to the public sphere, do you believe that Israel should be ...

1. More religious than it is 2. Just as it is 3. Less religious than it is

16. In your opinion, is Israel becoming more secular or more religious?

1. Much more secular 2. Slightly more secular 3. No change 4. Slightly more religious
 5. Much more religious

17. In your opinion, can Israel be both a Jewish state that observes halakhah and a democratic state?

1. Absolutely yes 2. Yes 3. No 4. Absolutely not

18. To what extent are you interested in this issue?

1. Very interested 2. Interested 3. Not very interested 4. Not at all interested

19. If there is a contradiction between halakhah and democratic principles, should preference be given to democratic principles or halakhah?

1. Democracy should always be given preference.
 2. Sometimes one and sometimes the other.
 3. Halakhah should always be given preference.

Are you for or against each of the following?	Strongly in favor	In favor	Against	Strongly against
20. The operation of movie theaters on the Sabbath	1	2	3	4
21. The operation of public transportation on the Sabbath	1	2	3	4
22. The operation of shopping centers on the Sabbath	1	2	3	4
23. The operation of cafes and restaurants on the Sabbath	1	2	3	4
24. Sporting events on the Sabbath	1	2	3	4

25. In your opinion, does the food in public institutions have to be kosher?

1. The food has to be kosher, absolutely.
2. Perhaps yes.
3. Perhaps no.
4. There is absolutely no need for the food in public institutions to be kosher.

26. As is known, sometimes the rabbinate refuses to give a *kashrut* certificate to institutions that serve kosher food because they do not observe other religious precepts or customs. In your opinion, should this or should this not be the case?

1. Yes, absolutely.
2. Perhaps yes.
3. Perhaps not.
4. Absolutely not.

27. In your opinion, should civil marriage (not through the rabbinate) be introduced in Israel?

1. Yes, absolutely
2. Yes
3. Perhaps yes
4. Perhaps not
5. No
6. Absolutely not

28. If civil marriage were available in Israel, do you believe that you or a member of your family would choose this option?

1. Yes, absolutely
2. Yes
3. Perhaps yes
4. Perhaps not
5. No
6. Absolutely not

29. In your opinion, do the rabbinic courts take a pertinent and neutral position in matters of marriage and divorce or do they favor one side or the other?

1. Pertinent and neutral
2. Favors the man
3. Favors the woman
4. Favors sometimes one and sometimes the other

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following opinions?	Totally agree	Agree	Disagree	Totally disagree
30. A person can be a good Jew even if he does not observe religious tradition.	1	2	3	4
31. Without the Jewish religion the Jewish people would no longer exist.	1	2	3	4
32. People today are concerned mainly about themselves.	1	2	3	4
33. Yeshiva students should be conscripted for military service.	1	2	3	4
34. The Conservative and the Reform movements should have equal status in Israel with the Orthodox.	1	2	3	4
35. The Jewish people in Israel are a different people than the Jews abroad.	1	2	3	4

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements	Totally agree	Agree	Disagree	Totally disagree
36. It is best if the man works to support the family and the woman stays home and takes care of the children.	1	2	3	4
37. A woman can fulfill herself even without children.	1	2	3	4
38. There is no need to modify the status of women in Israel from the current situation.	1	2	3	4

Do you support or oppose the following?	Totally support	Support	Oppose	Totally oppose
39. A Jew can immigrate to Israel and receive Israeli citizenship immediately.	1	2	3	4
40. The non-Jewish spouse of a Jew can immigrate to Israel and receive Israeli citizenship immediately.	1	2	3	4
41. A non-Jew with only one Jewish grandfather can immigrate to Israel and receive citizenship immediately.	1	2	3	4

42. To what extent is Jewish tradition important for your daily conduct?

1. Very important 2. Important 3. Not important 4. Not at all important

Would you say that Jewish tradition is important for...?	Very important	Fairly important	Not important	Not at all important
43. How I dress	1	2	3	4
44. How I behave when abroad	1	2	3	4
45. My political views.	1	2	3	4
46. The number of children in my family	1	2	3	4
47. What I do on the Sabbath	1	2	3	4
48. My position on the environment	1	2	3	4
49. My position on welfare and helping the needy	1	2	3	4
50. My choice of a spouse	1	2	3	4
51. My choice of occupation	1	2	3	4

How important are the following as principles guiding your life?	Very important	Fairly important	Not important	Not at all important
52. Having a family	1	2	3	4
53. Living in Israel	1	2	3	4
54. Making a lot of money	1	2	3	4
55. Striving for social justice	1	2	3	4
56. Feeling part of the Jewish people	1	2	3	4
57. Feeling part of Israeli society	1	2	3	4
58. Remembering the Holocaust	1	2	3	4
59. Celebrating the Jewish holidays as prescribed by religious tradition	1	2	3	4
60. Studying <i>Tanakh</i> , Talmud, and other Jewish texts	1	2	3	4

61. Are you in favor of or opposed to additional Jewish studies in the State (secular) school system?

1. Absolutely in favor 2. In favor 3. Opposed 4. Totally opposed

62. To what extent would you consent for your children to attend an elementary school that enrolls pupils from both religious and secular families?

1. Strongly consent 2. Consent to some extent 3. Consent to a slight extent
4. Totally opposed

63. In your opinion, how good are the relations between the religious and nonreligious?

1. Very good 2. Fairly good 3. Not so good 4. Not at all good

64. Do any of your close friends differ from you with regard to the extent of their observance of the religious precepts (more observant or less observant than you are)?

1. None 2. A few 3. About half 4. Most 5. All

65. Would you be willing for your son or daughter to marry a non-Jew?

1. Absolutely willing 2. Willing 3. Opposed 4. Utterly opposed
5. Not relevant (no children)

66. Do you want to live in Israel in the long term?

1. Certainly yes 2. Yes but not certain 3. I have my doubts 4. Certainly not

67. Do you feel that you are part of the Jewish people throughout the world?

1. Absolutely yes 2. Yes 3. No 4. Absolutely not

68. Do you believe that Jews in Israel and Jews in the Diaspora have a shared destiny?

1. Absolutely yes 2. Yes 3. No 4. Absolutely not

69. Which of these terms best defines your identity?

1. Israeli 2. Jewish 3. My ethnic group (Ashkenazi or Sephardi)
4. My level of religious observance (religious or nonreligious)

70. Which comes second?

71. Which comes third?

72. Which comes fourth?

73. How would you define yourself religiously?

1. Haredi 2. Orthodox 3. Traditional 4. Not religious but not anti-religious (secular)
5. Anti-religious

74. If you could be born a second time, would you want to be born a Jew?

1. Certainly yes
2. To some extent
3. It would not make a difference to me
4. No
5. Certainly not

75. If you could be born a second time, would you want to be born an Israeli?

1. Certainly yes
2. To some extent
3. It would not make a difference to me
4. No
5. Certainly not

76. Do you see yourself as a Zionist?

1. Absolutely yes 2. Yes 3. No 4. Absolutely not

77. Would you say that your way of life is compatible with Jewish values?

1. Absolutely yes 2. Yes 3. No 4. Absolutely not

78. To what extent do you observe religious tradition?

1. I observe religious tradition meticulously.
 2. I observe religious tradition to a great extent.
 3. I observe religious tradition to some extent.
 4. I do not observe religious tradition at all (totally secular).

79. Is/was religious tradition observed in your parents' home?

1. It is/was observed meticulously.
 2. It is/was observed to a great extent.
 3. It is/was observed to some extent.
 4. It is/was not observed at all (totally secular).

80. Does your spouse observe religious tradition?

1. He/she observes it meticulously.
 2. He/she observes it to a great extent.
 3. He/she observes it to some extent.
 4. He/she does not observe it at all (totally secular).
 5. Not married.

81. Do you feel that you are more religious or less religious today than you were in the past?

1. Much more religious 2. More religious 3. No difference 4. Less religious
 5. Much less religious

82. To what extent do you want your children to observe religious tradition?

1. I want my children to observe religious tradition meticulously.
 2. I want my children to observe religious tradition to a great extent.
 3. I want my children to observe religious tradition to some extent.
 4. I don't want my children to observe religious tradition.

83. Do you fast on Yom Kippur?

1. Always, the whole day
 2. Always, but only part of the day
 3. Frequently, the whole day

4. From time to time

5. Occasionally

6. Never

84. How often do you go to synagogue?

1. Several times a day

2. Once a day

3. Almost every Sabbath and holiday, but not on weekdays

4. Only on the High Holy Days (Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur)

5. Only for special occasions—bar/bat mitzvah, the Groom's Sabbath, and so on

6. Never

Do you?	Always	Frequently	Sometimes	Occasionally	Never
85. Hear the public reading of the <i>Megillah</i> on Purim	1	2	3	4	5
86. Refrain from eating <i>hametz</i> on Passover	1	2	3	4	5
87. Attend an all-night study session on Shavuot	1	2	3	4	5
88. Light Hanukkah candles	1	2	3	4	5

To what extent is it important for you that you and your family members conduct ...?	Very important	Important	Not so important	Not important at all
89. A Passover <i>seder</i>	1	2	3	4
90. A bar mitzvah	1	2	3	4
91. A bat mitzvah	1	2	3	4
92. Circumcision	1	2	3	4

(For those who answered "very important" or "important")

Would you say that the main reason that you participate in _____ is religious or social and family-related?	Religious	Social or family related
93. A Passover <i>seder</i>	1	2
94. A bar mitzvah	1	2
95. A bat mitzvah	1	2
96. Circumcision	1	2

To what extent is it important for you that you and your family ...?	Very important	Important	Not so important	Not important at all
97. Be married by a rabbi?	1	2	3	4
98. Have a traditional Jewish burial?	1	2	3	4
99. Sit <i>shiva</i> ?	1	2	3	4
100. Say <i>kaddish</i> for parents?	1	2	3	4

101. Do you observe the Sabbath?

1. I observe the Sabbath meticulously.
2. I observe the Sabbath to a great extent.
3. I observe it to some extent.
4. I don't observe the Sabbath at all.

On the Sabbath, to what extent do people in your home ...?	Always	Frequently	Sometimes	Occasionally	Never
102. Light Sabbath candles?	1	2	3	4	5
103. Recite <i>kiddush</i> on Friday night?	1	2	3	4	5
104. Have a special meal on Friday night?	1	2	3	4	5

On the Sabbath do you...?	Always	Frequently	Sometimes	Occasionally	Never
105. Try to spend a lot of time with the family	1	2	3	4	5
106. Go shopping	1	2	3	4	5
107. Work for pay	1	2	3	4	5
108. Go out to have a good time and eat	1	2	3	4	5
109. Go swimming at the pool or beach or engage in other sporting activity	1	2	3	4	5
110. Watch television or listen to the radio	1	2	3	4	5
111. Surf the Internet	1	2	3	4	5

112. Do you eat kosher at home?

1. Always
2. Usually
3. Sometimes
4. Occasionally
5. Never

113. Do you eat kosher outside the home?

1. Always 2. Usually 3. Sometimes 4. Occasionally 5. Never

114. Do you wait between eating meat foods and dairy foods?

1. Always 2. Usually 3. Sometimes 4. Occasionally 5. Never

115. Do you eat pork?

1. Frequently 2. Occasionally 3. Occasionally 4. Never

(For those who answered "Never")

116. Would you say that the main reason you refrain from eating pork is religious or something else?

1. Religious 2. Something else

117. Are you more meticulous about keeping kosher today than you were in the past, less so, or to the same extent?

1. Much more 2. More 3. No change 4. Less 5. Much less

And what about?	Much more	More	No change	Less	Much less
118. Observing the Sabbath?	1	2	3	4	5
119. Studying Tanakh, Talmud, or Jewish texts?	1	2	3	4	5

120. Do you visit the tombs of the righteous?

1. Frequently 2. Sometimes 3. Occasionally 4. Never 5. I cannot because of a religious prohibition (I am a kohen, etc.)

121. Do you consult with a rabbi about personal problems?

1. Always 2. Frequently 3. Sometimes 4. Occasionally 5. Never

122. Have you ever attended/do you attend services or religious ceremonies in a Reform or Conservative synagogue?

1. On a regular basis 2. Frequently 3. Occasionally 4. Never

To what extent do you believe or not believe each of the following statements?	Believe wholeheartedly	Believe but sometimes doubt	Generally doubt, but sometimes believe	Do not believe at all
123. Good deeds are rewarded	1	2	3	4
124. Bad deeds are punished	1	2	3	4
125. God exists	1	2	3	4
126. The Messiah will come	1	2	3	4
127. There is a World to Come and life after death	1	2	3	4
128. The Torah and precepts are God-given	1	2	3	4
129. A Jew who does not observe the religious precepts endangers the entire Jewish people	1	2	3	4
130. Prayer can help you escape a bad situation	1	2	3	4
131. A higher power governs the world	1	2	3	4
132. The Jews are the chosen people	1	2	3	4

133. Have you been studying *Tanakh*, Talmud, or other Jewish texts recently? If so, how much?

1. A lot 2. A fair amount 3. A little bit 4. Not at all

134. How many hours a week? _____

135.1 In what framework? _____

135.2 In what framework? _____

	A lot	A fair amount	Not very much	Not at all
136. Are you interested in musical expressions of Judaism?	1	2	3	4
137. Do you surf the Internet for Jewish topics?	1	2	3	4
138. Are you interested in New Age/spirituality/mysticism?	1	2	3	4

139. If so (1 or 2 above):

Which? _____

140. In your opinion, is a soldier entitled to disobey an order to evacuate settlements?

1. It is absolutely forbidden to disobey orders 2. I think it is forbidden to disobey orders
3. I think it is permitted to disobey orders 4. It is absolutely permitted to disobey orders

(for those who answered 3 or 4)

141. Would you say that the main reason you think this is religious or something else?

1. Religious 2. Something else

142. In your opinion, is a soldier entitled to disobey an order to serve in the territories?

1. It is absolutely forbidden to disobey orders 2. I think it is forbidden to disobey orders 3. I think it is permitted to disobey orders 4. It is absolutely permitted to disobey orders

143. To what extent do you support the idea of "territories for peace"?

1. To a great extent 2. To some extent 3. To a slight extent 4. Not at all

144. Would you say that the main reason you think this is religious or something else?

1. Religious 2. Something else

145. In the summer of 2005, did you support or oppose the disengagement plan?

1. I supported it strongly 2. I supported it 3. I neither supported it nor opposed it 4. I was opposed to it 5. I was strongly opposed to it

146. What is your position on the evacuation of settlements in the territories as part of a permanent peace accord?

1. Settlements should not be evacuated, no matter what. 2. I would evacuate some settlements in appropriate conditions 3. I would evacuate all settlements, including those in the major settlement blocs, in appropriate conditions.

147. Would you say that the main reason you think this is religious or something else?

1. Religious 2. Something else

148. As part of a permanent accord with the Palestinians, to what extent would you agree for Israel to transfer the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem to Palestinian control?

1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Do not really agree 4. Totally disagree

149. Would you say that the main reason you think this is religious or something else?

1. Religious 2. Something else

150. Interviewee's sex [circle one]

1. Male 2. Female

151. How old are you? _____

152. Where were you born? _____

(For those born abroad)

153. What year did you make *aliya*? _____

(for those who made *aliya* from the former Soviet Union since 1989)

154. Please mark:

1. Immigrant from the former Soviet Union

(155–156. For immigrants from the former Soviet Union only)

155. Are you?

1. Jewish on both sides
2. Jewish mother only
3. Jewish father only
4. Other (Ukrainian, Russian, etc.)

156. Is your spouse?

1. Jewish on both sides
2. Jewish mother only
3. Jewish father only
4. Other (Ukrainian, Russian, etc.)

157. How would you define yourself religiously?

1. Haredi
2. National Haredi
3. National Religious
4. Conservative
5. Reform
6. Other (please specify)
7. I don't identify with any stream

158. Where was your father born? _____

159. Where was your mother born? _____

160. What is your mother tongue? _____

161. What language do you generally speak at home? _____

162. What is your ethnic origin?

1. Ashkenazi
2. Mizrahi/Sephardi
3. Mixed (both Ashkenazi and Sephardi)
4. Other (please specify)

163. What was the atmosphere in your home when you were growing up?

1. Ashkenazi
2. Mizrahi/Sephardi
3. Both Ashkenazi and Sephardi
4. Neither

164. How would you define the atmosphere in your home today?

1. Ashkenazi
2. Mizrahi/Sephardi
3. Both Ashkenazi and Sephardi
4. Neither

165. How many years did you attend school?

166. Do you have an academic degree?

1. Yes
2. No

167. Were you a member of a youth movement?

1. Yes
2. No

168.1 If so, which?

168.2 If so, which?

169. For how many years?

170. Did you study in any religious school or program?

171. If so, which?

172. For how many years?

173. Last month, the monthly income of an average four-person family in Israel was NIS 9,500 net. Is your income:

1. Far above the average 2. Slightly above the average 3. About average
4. Slightly below the average 5. Far below the average

174. Do you have a car (is there a car that you usually drive)?

1. Yes 2. No

175. How many siblings do you have? _____

176. How many children do you have? _____

177. What is your family status?

1. Unmarried 2. Married 3. Widowed 4. Divorced

(for those married now or in the past)

178. What kind of wedding did you have?

(for those who are not married)

179. Are you living with a partner today?

1. Yes 2. No

(for those who answered yes)

180. Do you have children together?

1. Yes 2. No

181. Are you raising or did you raise children as a single parent?

1. Yes 2. No

182. Many talk about left and right in politics. Where would you locate yourself on the left-right continuum, with 1 = far right and 7 = far left?

- Right 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Left

183. Are you closely acquainted with someone who has converted or is going through the conversion process through the Israeli rabbinate?

1. Yes 2. No

Thank you!

Appendix B: Comparison of the 2009 Sample with Central Bureau of Statistics Surveys

Figures 58 to 61 compare the sample used for the Guttman–AVI CHAI survey with those of the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) for 2007–2009.

Figure 58: **Self-defined religiosity—Comparison of CBS surveys (2007–2009) with the Guttman–AVI CHAI survey of 2009** (percent)




Figure 59: **Ethnic origin—Comparison of CBS surveys (2007–2009) with the Guttman–AVI CHAI survey of 2009** (percent)




Figure 60: District of residence—Comparison of CBS surveys (2007–2009) with the Guttman–AVI CHAI survey of 2009 (percent)





Figure 61: Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union and other Israelis—Comparison of CBS surveys (2007–2009) with the Guttman–AVI CHAI survey of 2009 (percent)



Appendix C: Extraction of Factors for the Various Chapters

Chapter 2: Jewish Lifestyle and Practices

Table 1 displays the distribution of the 35 statements to six factors and their loadings for the various factors obtained by the statistical method of factor analysis.

Table 1: Loadings obtained from the factor analysis of statements that represent Jewish lifestyles and practices

Factors and Statements	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6
1. Religious practices and customs						
Do you attend an all-night study session on Shavuot?	.802	.107	.135	.195	.136	.071
How often do you go to synagogue?	.737	.215	.277	.244	.181	.061
Have you been studying <i>Tanakh</i> , Talmud, or other Jewish texts recently? If so, how much?	.732	.075	.081	.242	.135	.232
Do you observe the Sabbath?	.705	.167	.318	.309	.312	.062
Do you go to hear the public reading of the <i>Megillah</i> on Purim?	.703	.200	.286	.255	.210	.150
Do you consult with a rabbi about personal problems?	.683	.132	.183	.283	.035	.153
Do you visit the graves of the righteous?	.638	.164	.267	.214	.035	.134
2. Civil-religious practices and customs						
To what extent is it important for you that you and your family members conduct a bar mitzvah?	.125	.849	.248	.125	.094	.044
To what extent is it important for you that you and your family members conduct a circumcision?	.075	.788	.236	.135	.075	.013
To what extent is it important for you that you and your family members attend a Passover <i>seder</i> ?	.167	.734	.246	.119	.117	.101
To what extent is it important for you that you and your family members conduct a bat mitzvah?	.021	.728	.080	.019	.037	.109
To what extent is it important for you that you and your family members sit <i>shiva</i> ?	.171	.715	.353	.174	.043	-.015
To what extent is it important for you that you and your family members say <i>kaddish</i> for parents?	.176	.707	.382	.170	-.009	-.002
To what extent is it important for you that you and your family members have a traditional Jewish burial?	.180	.645	.451	.213	.035	-.032
Celebrating the Jewish holidays as prescribed by religious tradition is an important principle guiding my life.	.252	.520	.376	.255	.135	.059

Factors and Statements	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6
3. Traditional practices						
Do you eat kosher at home?	.159	.361	.768	.183	.133	.056
Do you eat only kosher outside the home?	.181	.286	.735	.192	.160	.019
Do you avoid eating meat and dairy foods together?	.346	.233	.661	.266	.193	.049
Do you eat pork?	.048	.203	.657	.159	.106	.093
Do you fast on Yom Kippur?	.278	.384	.622	.143	.070	.015
Do you eat refrain from eating <i>hametz</i> on Passover?	.159	.268	.603	.049	.082	.047
On the Sabbath, to what extent do people in your home recite <i>kiddush</i> ?	.402	.308	.597	.158	.109	.077
On the Sabbath, to what extent do people in your home light the Sabbath candles?	.352	.315	.584	.142	.148	.090
4. Routine-daily life decisions						
Tradition is important for my selection of an occupation.	.297	.122	.157	.780	.007	.094
Tradition is important for how many children I want to have in my family.	.337	.133	.127	.723	.080	.045
Tradition is important for my choice of a spouse.	.265	.246	.212	.694	.089	.092
Tradition is important for how I dress.	.433	.184	.254	.658	.159	.061
Tradition is important for how I behave when abroad.	.255	.236	.273	.655	.109	.156
5. Sabbath prohibitions						
Do you go shopping on the Sabbath?	.212	.052	.120	.046	.830	.031
Do you work for pay on the Sabbath?	-.018	.133	.088	-.026	.772	-.018
Do you go out to have a good time and eat on the Sabbath?	.406	.054	.299	.250	.672	.009
Do you go swimming at the pool or beach or engage in other sporting activity on the Sabbath?	.427	.063	.215	.270	.628	-.001
6. "Contemporary" Jewish interest						
Are you interested in New Age/spirituality/mysticism?	-.029	.036	.088	.023	-.099	.808
Do you surf the Internet for Jewish topics	.278	.058	.051	.105	.077	.767
Are you interested in musical expressions of Judaism?	.352	.086	.049	.175	.063	.723
Variance explained (%)	42%	10%	6%	4%	3%	3%
Reliability (Cronbach's alpha)	0.92	0.92	0.91	0.89	0.83	0.73

Chapter 3: Religious Belief and Social Values

Table 3 displays the distribution of the 14 statements to three factors and their loadings for the various factors obtained by the statistical method of factor analysis.

Table 3: Loadings obtained from the factor analysis of statements that represent belief and values

Factors and Statements	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
1. Religious belief			
To what extent do you believe or not believe that good deeds are rewarded?	.827	.029	.011
To what extent do you believe or not believe that God exists?	.821	.154	.063
To what extent do you believe or not believe that a higher power governs the world?	.815	.166	.025
To what extent do you believe or not believe that prayer can help you escape a bad situation?	.796	.234	.011
To what extent do you believe or not believe that bad deeds are punished?	.794	.030	.087
To what extent do you believe or not believe that the Torah and precepts are God-given?	.784	.344	.142
To what extent do you believe or not believe in a World to Come and life after death?	.744	.322	.126
To what extent do you believe or not believe that the Jews are the chosen people?	.732	.334	.135
To what extent do you believe or not believe that the Messiah will come?	.722	.429	.211
To what extent do you believe or not believe that a Jew who does not observe the religious precepts endangers the entire Jewish people?	.557	.391	.314
2. Social values			
Tradition is important for my positions on the environment.	.176	.871	.094
Tradition is important for my positions on welfare and helping the needy.	.259	.846	.067
3. The status of women in Israel			
To what extent do you agree that there is no need to modify the status of women in Israel from the current situation?	.033	.004	.825
To what extent do you agree that It is best if the man works to support the family and the woman stays home and takes care of the children?	.118	.157	.751
Variance explained (%)	51%	61%	69%
Reliability (Cronbach's alpha)	0.94	0.82	0.47

Chapter 5: Jewish and Israeli Identity

Table 4 displays the distribution of the 11 statements to two factors and their loadings for the various factors obtained by the statistical method of factor analysis.

Table 4: Loadings obtained from the factor analysis of statements that represent attitudes related to Jewish and Israeli identity


Factors and Statements	Factor 1	Factor 2
1. Belonging to Israel and the Jewish people		
Living in Israel is an important principle guiding my life.	.732	.182
Feeling part of the Jewish people is an important principle guiding my life.	.715	.236
If you could be born a second time, would you want to be born an Israeli?	.700	.169
Feeling part of Israeli society is an important principle guiding my life.	.685	-.228
Do you see yourself as a Zionist?	.638	.002
If you could be born a second time, would you want to be born a Jew?	.635	.369
Do you want to live in Israel in the long term?	.505	.096
Remembering the Holocaust is an important principle guiding my life.	.505	-.048
2. Support for Orthodox positions on "who is a Jew"		
Do you support the following statement: "The non-Jewish spouse of a Jew should be allowed to immigrate to Israel and receive Israeli citizenship immediately"?	.064	.847
Do you support the following statement: "A non-Jew with only one Jewish grandfather can immigrate to Israel and receive citizenship immediately"?	.033	.847
Do you support the following statement: "The Conservative and the Reform movements should have equal status in Israel with the Orthodox"?	.121	.738
Variance explained (%)	33%	18%
Reliability (Cronbach's alpha)	0.80	0.77

Appendix D: Comparison of the Attitudes of the Background Groups for the Various Chapters

Differences between Background Groups in Chapter 1: Religiosity and the Observance of Tradition, 2009

Significant differences were found between immigrants from the Soviet Union and other Israeli Jews in how they define their religiosity and the extent to which they observe religious tradition. See Figures 62 and 63.⁸⁹

Figures 62 and 63: Immigrants from the former Soviet Union compared to the rest of the population (percent)




The percentage of immigrants from the former Soviet Union who define themselves as secular but not anti-religious (including a few who are secular and anti-religious) is much higher than the figure for other Israeli Jews (79% and 43%, respectively). Conversely, the percentage of the rest of the population who define themselves as Traditional, Orthodox, or Haredi is higher than the figure for immigrants from the former Soviet Union (56% and 22%, respectively). A similar trend was found in the segmentation of the population by the degree of observance of religious tradition.

⁸⁹ Chi-square analysis found statistically significant differences for self-defined religiosity and extent of observance of religious tradition ($p < .001$).

There were significant differences between the three ethnic groups of respondents—Ashkenazim, Mizrahim, and mixed parentage⁹⁰—in how they define their religiosity and the extent to which they observe religious tradition (see Figures 64 and 65).⁹¹

Figures 64 and 65: **Ethnic groups: Mizrahim, Ashkenazim, and mixed parentage** (percent)




- The patterns of religious self-identification and the degree of observance of religious tradition of those of mixed parentage (Ashkenazi and Mizrahi) are more like those of Ashkenazim than of Mizrahim. Most Ashkenazim (67%) and persons of mixed parentage (62%) are secular (but not anti-religious), while a few are anti-religious; by contrast, most Mizrahim are Traditional, Orthodox, or Haredi (73%).
- More Mizrahim define themselves as Traditional than do those of mixed parentage and Ashkenazim (44%, 23%, and 18%, respectively). In addition, a larger proportion of Mizrahim define themselves as Orthodox or Haredi, as compared to those of mixed parentage and Ashkenazim (29%, 15%, and 17%, respectively).
- A similar trend was found with regard to the degree of observance of religious tradition.

90 Ethnic group was determined by respondents' answer to item 162 on the questionnaire (see Appendix A).

91 Chi-square analysis found statistically significant differences for self-defined religiosity and extent of observance of religious tradition ($p < .001$).

There were statistically significant differences among income categories⁹² with regard to their self-defined religiosity and observance of religious tradition (see Figures 66 and 67).⁹³

Figures 66 and 67: **Income levels** (percent)



92 Income level was determined by respondents' answer to item 173 on the questionnaire (see Appendix A).


93 Chi-square analysis found statistically significant differences for self-defined religiosity and extent of observance of religious tradition ($p < .001$).

- Most of those with an income far above the average defined themselves as secular but not anti-religious or as secular and anti-religious (62%, as against 39%–48% of other income categories). Most of those with an income far above the average do not observe religious tradition at all or only to some extent (75%, as against 50%–65% of other income categories).
- By contrast, most of those with an income below average (slightly or far below) defined themselves as Traditional, Orthodox, or Haredi (61% of the respondents in these categories), and half of them observe religious tradition to a great extent or meticulously.
- The percentage of Haredim among those with an income that is slightly or far below average exceeds the figure in the other categories (12% and 17%, respectively, as against 3% to 5% of respondents in the other categories). Similarly, the percentage of those with an income that is slightly or far below average who observe religious tradition meticulously exceeds the average (20% and 23%, respectively, as against 6% to 11% of respondents in the other categories).
- The patterns of self-defined religiosity and extent of observance of religious tradition of those with an average or slightly above-average income were quite similar: half of them are secular (whether anti-religious or not anti-religious), about a third are Traditional, and nearly one-fifth define themselves as Orthodox or Haredi.


There were statistically significant differences among respondents of different educational levels with regard to their self-defined religious identity and observance of religious tradition,⁹⁴ as can be seen in Figures 68 and 69.

Figures 68 and 69: **Education levels** (percent)

Distribution of self-defined religiosity



Distribution of extent of observance of religious tradition




94 Chi-square analysis found statistically significant differences for self-defined religiosity and extent of observance of religious tradition ($p < .001$).

- The patterns of religious self-identification of those with a relatively low level of education (12 years of education or 11 years or less) are quite similar: a majority define themselves as Traditional, Orthodox, or Haredi (more than 60%). More specifically, nearly 40% define themselves as secular but not anti-religious, and another 3% as secular and anti-religious. In addition, 20% define themselves as Orthodox or Haredi—although a larger proportion of these categories (more than 40%) say they observe religious tradition to a great extent or meticulously.
- Most of those with more than 12 years of schooling but no university degree, too, define themselves as Traditional, Orthodox, or Haredi. The proportion of Haredim in this group is relatively higher than in other groups (18%, as against 5%–8% in the other educational categories), evidently because it includes yeshiva students.
- Those with a university degree differ from all the other groups. Most define themselves as secular but not anti-religious, and some as secular and anti-religious (60% for the two, as against 37%–44% in all the other groups). Correspondingly, most of them observe religious tradition only to some extent or do not observe it at all (68%, as against 45%–57% in the other groups).

There were statistically significant differences in how women and men define their religiosity and the extent to which they observe religious tradition (see Figures 70 and 71).⁹⁵

Figures 70 and 71: **Gender** (percent)




⁹⁵ Chi-square analysis found statistically significant differences for self-defined religiosity ($p < .001$) and extent of observance of religious tradition ($p < .01$).

More women than men defined themselves as Traditional (34% and 29%, respectively); more men than women defined themselves as Haredi (10% and 5%, respectively).

Correspondingly, a larger percentage of women reported that they observe tradition "to some extent" or a "great extent" (74% of women, 66% of men), while a higher percentage of men reported that they observe tradition meticulously (16% of men and 11% of women).

Differences between Background Groups in Chapter 2: Jewish Lifestyle and Practices


Figure 72: Average observance of Jewish traditions and customs; Immigrants from the former Soviet Union compared to other Israeli Jews



- For all religious traditions investigated, the immigrants from the former Soviet Union reported a weaker attachment than did other Israeli Jews (see Figure 72).⁹⁶

⁹⁶ MANOVA analysis of the six factors that reflect the different degrees of attachment to Jewish religious practices, found statistically significant differences between immigrants from the FSU and the rest of the population ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each factor, comparing immigrants from the FSU with the rest of the population, found statistically significant effects for all six ($p < .001$).


Figure 73: Average observance of Jewish traditions and customs; by ethnic group



- In all six categories, Mizrahi respondents reported a stronger attachment to Jewish religious tradition than did other respondents (see Figure 73).⁹⁷

⁹⁷ MANOVA analysis of the six factors that reflect the different degrees of attachment to Jewish religious practices found statistically significant differences with regard to ethnic origin ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each factor by ethnic origin, found statistically significant effects for all six ($p < .001$).


Figure 74: Average observance of Jewish traditions and customs; by income level



- Lower-income respondents report greater observance of Jewish religious traditions than do those with higher incomes. These differences are less salient for what we have defined as customs commonly observed in Israel and for “contemporary” Jewish interests (see Figure 74).⁹⁸

98 MANOVA analysis of the six factors that reflect the different degrees of attachment to Jewish religious practices found statistically significant differences with regard to income level ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each factor by income, found statistically significant effects for all six ($p < .001$).


Figure 75: Average observance of Jewish traditions and customs; by educational level



- Those with a university degree report a weaker attachment to Jewish practices in almost every dimension examined (see Figure 75).⁹⁹

⁹⁹ MANOVA analysis of the six factors that reflect the different degrees of attachment to Jewish religious practices found statistically significant differences with regard to educational level ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each factor by educational level, found statistically significant effects for five of them (except for interest in "contemporary" Jewish topics: for Sabbath prohibitions, $p < .05$; for the other factors, $p < .001$).


Figure 76: Average observance of Jewish traditions and customs; by age cohort



- Respondents aged 50 and over report lesser observance of traditional Jewish customs than do those who are younger than 50. Older respondents are more observant of Sabbath prohibitions, while younger respondents are more interested in “contemporary” Jewish topics (see Figure 76).¹⁰⁰

100 MANOVA analysis of the six factors that reflect the different degrees of attachment to Jewish religious practices found statistically significant differences with regard to age ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each factor by age, found statistically significant effects for three of them: Jewish religious precepts and customs ($p < .01$), observance of Sabbath prohibitions and interest in “contemporary” Jewish topics ($p < .001$).

Figure 77: Average observance of Jewish traditions and customs; by gender



- Men report a stronger attachment to Jewish religious customs and a more religious lifestyle than do women (see Figure 77).¹⁰¹

101 MANOVA analysis of the six factors that reflect the different degrees of attachment to Jewish religious practices found statistically significant differences with regard to gender ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each factor by gender, found statistically significant effects for Jewish customs commonly observed in Israel ($p < .05$) and for Jewish religious precepts and customs and a religious lifestyle ($p < .001$).

Differences between Background Groups in Chapter 3: Religious Belief and Social Values

Immigrants from the former Soviet Union report a weaker religious faith than the rest of the population (average scores of 1.6 and 2.1, respectively).¹⁰²

Figure 78: Average score for religious belief; by ethnic group




- Respondents of Mizrahi background reported the strongest religious faith; those of mixed parentage reported a belief slightly stronger than those of Ashkenazi origin, whose faith was weakest of all (see Figure 78).¹⁰³

102 Univariate ANOVA, conducted on the factor reflecting religious belief, found statistically significant differences between immigrants from the FSU and the rest of the population ($p < .001$).


103 Univariate ANOVA, conducted on the factor reflecting religious belief, found statistically significant differences with regard to ethnic origin ($p < .001$).

Figure 79: Average score for religious belief; by income level




Religious belief was found to be stronger in proportion as income is lower (see Figure 79).¹⁰⁴

Figure 80: Average score for religious belief; by educational level



104 Univariate ANOVA, conducted on the factor reflecting religious belief, found statistically significant differences with regard to income ($p < .001$).

Figure 81: Average score for religious belief; by age cohort




- Older respondents—those aged 65 and over—report weaker faith than other respondents. No difference was found among the other age cohorts (see Figure 81).¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ Univariate ANOVA, conducted on the factor reflecting religious belief, found statistically significant differences with regard to age cohort level ($p < .001$).

Differences between Background Groups in Chapter 4: Religion and Tradition in the Public Sphere

Immigrants from the former Soviet Union are less accepting of manifestations of Jewish tradition and religion in the public sphere than the rest of the population (average score of 1.6 and 2.5, respectively).¹⁰⁶

Figure 82: Average agreement with expressions of religion and tradition in the public sphere; by ethnic group




- Mizrahi respondents are more accepting of expressions of tradition in the public sphere than are other respondents (see Figure 82).¹⁰⁷

106 Univariate ANOVA, conducted on this statement found statistically significant differences between immigrants from the FSU and other Israelis ($p < .001$).

107 Univariate ANOVA conducted on this statement found statistically significant differences by ethnic origin ($p < .001$).


Figure 83: Average agreement with expressions of religion and tradition in the public sphere; by income level



- Israeli Jews with lower incomes are more accepting of manifestations of religion and tradition in the public sphere than are those with a higher income (see Figure 83).¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ Univariate ANOVA conducted on this statement found statistically significant differences by income ($p < .001$).

Figure 84: Average agreement with expressions of religion and tradition in the public sphere; by educational level



- Respondents with a university education are less supportive of manifestations of religion and tradition in the public sphere than the rest of the respondents (see Figure 84).¹⁰⁹
- Men are slightly more accepting of manifestations of religion and tradition in the public sphere than are women (average scores of 2.6 and 2.3, respectively).¹¹⁰


109 Univariate ANOVA, conducted on this statement found statistically significant differences with regard to educational level ($p < .001$).

110 Univariate ANOVA conducted on this statement found statistically significant differences by gender ($p < .001$).

Differences between Background Groups in Chapter 5: Jewish and Israeli Identity

Differences were found between groups from different backgrounds with regard to their Jewish and Israeli identity. Those that are statistically significant are displayed in Figures 85–88.


Figure 85: Average agreement with factors that express attitudes about Jewish and Israeli identity; Immigrants from the former Soviet Union compared to the rest of the population



- The sense of belonging to Israel and the Jewish people and support for Orthodox positions about "who is a Jew" were weaker among immigrants from the former Soviet Union as compared to the rest of the population (see Figure 85).¹¹¹

¹¹¹ MANOVA analysis of the two factors relevant to Jewish and Israeli identity found statistically significant differences between immigrants from the FSU and the rest of the population ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each factor, found statistically significant effects for both of them ($p < .001$ in each case).


Figure 86: Average agreement with factors that express attitudes about Jewish and Israeli identity; by ethnic group



- The sense of belonging to Israel and the Jewish people and support for Orthodox positions about "who is a Jew" were stronger among Mizrahim than among Ashkenazim or Israelis of mixed parentage (see Figure 86).¹¹²

112 MANOVA analysis of the two factors relevant to Jewish and Israeli identity found statistically significant differences by ethnic origin ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each factor found statistically significant effects of ethnic origin for both of them ($p < .001$ in each case).


Figure 87: Average agreement with factors that express attitudes about Jewish and Israeli identity; by educational level



- The sense of belonging to Israel and the Jewish people is slightly stronger among those with 12 years of schooling or less than among those with more than 12 years.¹¹³
- Support for the Orthodox position on "who is a Jew" is lower among those with university degrees than among the rest of the population (1.7 and 2.0–2.2, respectively). See Figure 87.

113 MANOVA analysis of the two factors relevant to Jewish and Israeli identity found statistically significant differences with regard to educational level ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each factor, found statistically significant effects for educational level for both factors ($p < .001$ in each case).

Figure 88: Average agreement with factors that express attitudes about Jewish and Israeli identity; by age cohort



- The sense of belonging to Israel and the Jewish people is slightly stronger among older respondents, but support for the Orthodox position on "who is a Jew" is slightly stronger among younger respondents (see Figure 88).¹¹⁴

114 MANOVA analysis of the two factors relevant to Jewish and Israeli identity found statistically significant differences with regard to age cohort level ($p < .001$). Univariate ANOVA, conducted separately for each factor, found statistically significant effects for age cohort level for both factors: for belonging to Israel and Judaism, $p < .001$; for support of Orthodox positions on "who is a Jew," $p < .005$.

Research Team

The late **Prof. Asher Arian** was the academic director of the Guttman Center for Surveys, a Senior Fellow of the Israel Democracy Institute, and a professor of political science at the City University of New York.

Ayala Keissar-Sugarmen holds a master's degree in sociology and anthropology from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is the director of Amat-Middah, which provides evaluation and polling services.

Dror Walter is a research assistant at the Guttman Center for Surveys of the Israel Democracy Institute. He is pursuing a master's degree in political communication at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Shaul Slepak is a researcher at Amat-Middah and a member of the research and evaluation department of Pilat. He holds a master's degree in organizational and social psychology from Bar-Ilan University.

Dahlia Scheindlin was formerly on the staff of the Guttman Center for Surveys, where she worked on the present study. She is currently an independent public opinion pollster, a doctoral student in political science at Tel Aviv University, and an adjunct lecturer at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.

Prof. Tamar Hermann is the academic director of the Guttman Center for Surveys, a Senior Fellow of the Israel Democracy Institute, and a professor of political science at the Open University of Israel.

Dr. Raphael Ventura is database director at the Guttman Center for Surveys of the Israel Democracy Institute and a lecturer at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy of the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya.

